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ABSTRACT  
   
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is a strategic planning and management 
system that causally links actions and subsequent financial and nonfinancial 
outcomes.  The primary goal of the BSC is to motivate actions that are congruent 
with the organization's long-term strategy.  A secondary purpose of the BSC is to 
facilitate the performance evaluation of managers charged with advancing the 
corporate strategy.  To serve this second purpose the BSC must include a time 
dimension.  Specifically, the strategic plan must recognize time lags between 
actions taken, lead outcomes (often nonfinancial in nature) and lagged outcomes 
(usually financial success measures).  If an evaluator is not provided with timeline 
information a subordinate may be evaluated based on inappropriate performance 
metrics; that is, a subordinate may be held accountable for an outcome beyond the 
subordinate's time span of control.  This study evaluates the effect on performance 
evaluations and bonus allocations when evaluators are provided (or not provided) 
with a strategy implementation timeline.  This issue has not been previously 
examined in the literature.  This study also examines the moderating effect of 
experience, management buy-in to the corporate strategy, and affect on 
performance evaluations and bonus allocations.  Results from an experiment 
conducted with evening MBA students show that inclusion of a strategy 
implementation timeline leads to more normatively correct performance 
evaluations, but only for experienced participants.  Higher levels of both positive 
and negative affect were found to result in choice avoidance behavior.  Buy-in to 
the corporate strategy was not found to have an effect. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
A key goal of organizations is to improve managerial decision-making.  
Without superior managerial decision-making, organizational success in today’s 
competitive world is difficult to achieve.  One of management’s critical decision 
tasks is performance measurement and evaluation (Hilton 2008).  Strong 
performers should be rewarded, promoted, and motivated, while weak performers 
must be retrained or replaced.  Performance evaluations can be contentious as 
individuals’ careers can be significantly affected by the outcome.  Therefore, the 
criteria used to evaluate personnel should be appropriate and fair.  In this regard, 
personnel should only be held responsible for factors under their control.  If 
performance evaluations are based on measures that have not been under an 
employee’s control then decision quality declines and negative repercussions 
inevitably follow (Wilson and Chua 1993).  For example, when measures that are 
reflective of performance are ignored in post hoc performance evaluations, while 
non-reflective measures are emphasized, personnel can be expected to respond 
and adjust their decision-making processes in ways not in the firm’s best interest 
(Ghosh and Lusch 2000; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; McNamara and Fisch 
1964). 
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) was developed to help overcome observed 
deficiencies in extant evaluation models (Kaplan and Norton 1992).  The BSC is a 
multidimensional performance evaluation system that translates an organization’s 
strategic goals into a set of causally linked financial and nonfinancial objectives 
and performance measures.  The BSC has significantly increased in popularity 
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since its development.  For example, a survey of 382 companies in 44 countries 
found that more than 50-percent of respondents use a BSC approach to 
performance measurement tracking (Lawson et al. 2006).  However, recent 
research (e.g., Ittner et al. 2003a) argues that the cognitive limitations of managers 
may lead to non-normative judgments and decisions in BSC systems.  The 
increased complexity and subjectivity of BSCs can lead to dysfunctional 
performance evaluations wherein employees are evaluated based on 
uncontrollable measures or measures incongruent with the organization’s strategic 
objectives (Ittner et al. 2003a).  The findings of prior studies examining the 
influence of cognitive limitations in BSC-based performance evaluations have 
differed in their conclusions (e.g., Banker et al. 2004; Dilla and Steinbart 2005;  
Ittner and Larcker 1998; Ittner et al. 2003a; Ittner et al. 2003b;  Kaplan et al. 
2011; Libby et al. 2004; Lipe and Salterio 2000, 2002; Tayler 2010; Wong-on-
Wing et al., 2007).  One possible explanation for these mixed results is that prior 
studies have not provided evaluators with sufficient information to support 
optimal decision-making.  If there has been a critical missing variable in prior 
BSC studies, as I contend, findings of prior research may not be reliable. 
For example, non-normative behavior might manifest in instances where 
decision makers are not provided with adequate information to infer which 
performance measures have been under a subordinate’s control.  The nature of 
causal linkages in the BSC model implies a time lag between actions and 
outcomes.  If a manager is not provided with information regarding the requisite 
time span for an action to yield an outcome, then a subordinate may be held 
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responsible for measures beyond her/his time span of control.  Specifically, 
failure to provide requisite time span information between actions and BSC 
intermediate and ultimate outcomes (a causes b, which in turn causes c) may lead 
a manager to hold a subordinate responsible for a lagged measure (e.g., “c”) prior 
to there being sufficient time for improvement in the leading measures (e.g., “a” 
and/or “b”) to drive the lagged measure. 
Despite the importance of time span of control information, the original 
formulation of the BSC did not include a time dimension.  Researchers have 
recently commented on the absence of a time dimension in BSCs.  For example, 
Franco-Santos and Bourne (2005) note the scarcity of guidance in BSC literature 
regarding the identification of project milestones and timelines and attribute many 
BSC implementation failures to this cause.  Nørreklit (2000) argues that it is 
impossible to establish cause and effect linkages in the absence of an explicit time 
dimension as part of the BSC.  Further, Kaplan (2009) himself acknowledges the 
absence of a time dimension as a developmental limitation of the BSCs currently 
used in research and practice.  In response to these criticisms, I examine the effect 
of providing evaluators with an explicit strategy implementation timeline in BSC-
based performance evaluations and bonus allocations. 
Adding a strategy implementation timeline to future research studies, 
however, may not be sufficient.  That is, an evaluating manager must not only be 
provided with information regarding the timing between leading and lagged 
measures, but s/he must also “buy-in” to the logic and validity of the causal 
linkages contained within a strategy.  If this latter condition is not met then a 
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manager conducting a performance evaluation may rely on non-strategically-
linked measures contained within a BSC because s/he believes this action to be 
appropriate.  Though recent studies have demonstrated the importance of creating 
strategic awareness (Banker et al. 2004) and providing managers with information 
regarding the relevance and reliability of measures contained within a BSC 
(Libby et al. 2004), buy-in itself has not been explicitly examined in the context 
of BSC-based performance evaluations.  Consequently, I also examine the effect 
of evaluator buy-in on BSC-based performance evaluations and bonus allocations. 
Individuals’ experience may moderate the effectiveness of a strategy 
implementation timeline.  Prior research has consistently shown that more 
experienced managers are better able to disregard irrelevant information 
compared to less experienced managers (Bédard and Chi 1993).  This is at least 
partly explained by the fact that experienced individuals use their knowledge to 
apply directed information search strategies aimed at only acquiring relevant 
information.  Less experienced individuals tend to employ a sequential 
information search strategy, which exposes them to irrelevant information (Biggs 
et al. 1987; Biggs and Mock 1983; Bouwman 1984).  In a context in which a 
strategy and the related performance measures are unfamiliar, more experienced 
individuals may use a strategy map and accompanying implementation timeline to 
distinguish between relevant (strategically-linked measures within the 
controllable timeline) and irrelevant (non-strategically-linked measures and/or 
strategically-linked measures beyond the controllable timeline) information better 
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than less experienced individuals.  Therefore, I also examine the moderating 
influence of experience on a strategy implementation timeline. 
In addition to an implementation timeline, buy-in, and experience, 
individuals’ affective states may have an effect how information is processed in 
BSC performance evaluation contexts.  Affect, a general term used to describe 
both moods and emotions, is considered to be an integral component of judgment 
and decision making (Slovic 2000).  In fact, it is argued that decision-making 
behavior cannot be fully understood unless both cognition and affect are jointly 
considered (Ding and Beaulieu 2009; Iyer et al. 2012; Kida et al. 2001; LeDoux 
1996).  Prior research has shown that positive affect can result in individuals 
desiring to avoid stimuli that can alter their mood state (Mackie and Worth 1989).  
Consequently, individuals with positive affect have been shown to have poorer 
performance on tasks that involve effortful, detailed, and systematic thinking 
(Schwarz and Bless 1991).  Negative affect has been shown to result in choice 
avoidance behavior as a task becomes more difficult (Sawyer 2005).  Negative 
affect has also been shown to lead individuals to acquire larger quantities of 
information and to process individual pieces of information faster.  This has 
resulted in individuals with relatively higher levels of negative affect to spend less 
time examining the most important attributes of choice problems (Stone and 
Kadous, 1997).  The large quantity and potential ambiguity of information 
contained in BSCs makes performance evaluations in this context inherently 
difficult.  Further, effortful, detailed, and systematic cognition is required in these 
settings, which may lead individuals experiencing relatively higher levels of 
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positive or negative affect to process information differently than individuals with 
relatively lower levels of these affective states.  Therefore, I also measure and 
control for individual levels of both positive and negative affect in BSC-based 
performance evaluations and bonus allocations.  Subsequently, both positive and 
negative affect are partitioned into “high” and “low” groups to examine the choice 
avoidance behavior exhibited by individuals experiencing these affective states. 
An experiment was conducted in which participants acting as divisional 
managers of a hypothetical high-end retail chain evaluated subordinates based on 
strategically- and non-strategically-linked measures within and beyond the 
subordinates’ time span of control.  Results indicate that experienced participants 
that were provided with a strategy implementation timeline conducted 
performance evaluations and bonus allocations in a normatively correct manner 
(i.e., evaluated subordinates based on strategically-linked measures within the 
subordinate’s time span of control).1  Inexperienced participants that were 
provided with timeline information, based subordinates’ evaluations on 
strategically-linked measures beyond the controllable timeline, and/or on non-
strategically-linked measures.  This result is consistent with prior literature that 
finds that more experienced individuals have the sophisticated knowledge 
structures and procedural knowledge required to base BSC performance 
evaluations on only relevant performance measures (Krumwiede et al. 2011).  
Both positive and negative affect were shown to account for significant variance 
                                                 
1
 Four different measures of experience were tested in this study.  However, as discussed in the 
results section, only two provided significant results – years of full-time professional work 




in BSC-based performance evaluations and bonus allocations.  This reinforces the 
calls made in prior research regarding the necessity of controlling for individual 
affective states (Stone and Kadous 1997).  Further, higher levels of both positive 
and negative affect were found to result in choice avoidance behavior.  The extent 
to which managers bought-in to the strategy did not affect their performance 
evaluations or bonus allocations of subordinates. 
The results of this study contribute to the existing BSC literature in three 
important ways and have implications for multidimensional performance 
evaluation systems used in both research and practice.  First, this study is the first 
to explicitly test the effectiveness of providing managers with timeline 
information in an effort to induce more normative BSC-based performance 
evaluations (i.e., the extent to which evaluating managers hold subordinates 
responsible for only strategically-linked measures within subordinates’ time span 
of control).  Second, this study evaluates the moderating influence of experience 
on an implementation timeline.  Less experienced individuals were found to be 
unable to disregard irrelevant information even in the presence of timeline 
information.  However, more experienced participants used the timeline 
information to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information, and 
therefore, based subordinates performance evaluations and bonus allocations on 
only relevant information.  These findings provide a key methodological 
consideration in both practice and future research pertaining to multidimensional 
performance evaluations that include outcome measures with time horizons that 
may extend beyond the controllable timeframe of the evaluation period.  
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Specifically, the results indicate that normative BSC-based performance 
evaluations require (a) evaluators to have experience (preferably experience with 
multidimensional performance evaluations systems) and (b) that evaluators need 
to be provided with information regarding the timing relationship between lead 
and lag performance measures.  If these conditions are not met, then subordinates 
may be held accountable for performance metrics beyond their controllable time 
horizon and/or non-strategically-linked performance metrics.  Consequently, the 
subordinates can be expected to adjust their behavior in subsequent periods by 
focusing on improvement in areas that may not be in the best long-term interest of 
the firm.  Lastly, the results indicate that future BSC-related performance 
evaluation studies need to, at a minimum, consider controlling for individual 
affective states.  Individuals in this study with relatively higher levels of positive 
or negative affect were more reticent to make a difficult decision compared to 
individuals that with relatively lower levels of positive or negative affect.  While 
future studies can measure and control for individual affective states, it may be 
difficult to do so in practice.  However, companies should consider adopting 
training programs aimed at educating managers on the influence that affective 
states can have on the judgments and decisions they make. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Chapter II reviews 
relevant literature and hypotheses are developed, Chapters III and IV describe the 
experimental method and results, and Chapter V concludes with a discussion of 
the study’s implications and limitations. 
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CHAPTER II: MOTIVATION 
THE BALANCED SCORECARD 
The BSC was developed in the early 1990s in response to observed 
deficiencies in existing evaluation models (Kaplan and Norton 1992).  Kaplan and 
Norton contend that an exclusive reliance on short-term financial performance 
causes an organization to sacrifice long-term value creation for short-term 
financial gains (Kaplan and Norton 1996, 2001).  The BSC retains financial 
measures, but compliments them with measures on the drivers, or leading 
indicators of future financial performance.  The basic premise behind the BSC is 
that by measuring and improving performance on causally-linked leading 
indicators in the areas of an organization’s learning and growth activities, internal 
business processes, and customer relations, financial performance will, in time, 
improve (Kaplan and Norton 2001).   
Atkinson et al. (1997, p. 94) state, “the balanced scorecard is among the 
most significant developments in management accounting and, thus, deserves 
intense research attention.”  Several researchers have subsequently responded to 
this call.  One line of research, in combination with numerous anecdotal examples 
from Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001), finds general support for the basic premise 
underlying the BSC.  Specifically, financial performance may improve following 
efforts to measure and improve performance on causally-linked nonfinancial 
measures (Banker et al. 2000; Davis and Albright 2004; Hoque and James 2000; 
Ittner and Larcker 1998).  However, recent research (e.g., Ittner et al. 2003a) 
demonstrates that the effectiveness of a BSC may be constrained by the extent to 
10 
 
which managers’ cognitive limitations affect their judgments and decisions in 
BSC-based performance evaluations. 
BSC-based performance evaluations and cognitive limitations.  Lipe 
and Salterio (2000) was the first study to examine how managers’ cognitive 
limitations may lead to cognitive biases in a BSC performance evaluation context.  
Fundamental limitations in the mental processing of complex and ambiguous 
information may cause individuals to employ various simplifying strategies.  
These strategies may lead to cognitive biases (mental errors), which are consistent 
and predictable and may lead to non-normative behavior (Heuer 1999).  Lipe and 
Salterio (2000) find that managers use a simplifying strategy of ignoring measures 
that are unique to a particular division, and rely instead on measures that are 
common across divisions when conducting performance evaluations (even though 
unique measures are designed to capture a particular division’s unique business 
strategy).  They find that individuals overly rely on common measures because 
they are easier to compare across divisions than unique measures.  This 
simplifying strategy has come to be known as the “common measure bias.”  
Subsequent studies of the influence of managers’ cognitive limitations in BSC-
based performance evaluations have examined: the format/organization of the 
BSC (Lipe and Salterio 2002), fixation on financial measures (Ittner and Larcker 
1998; Ittner et al. 2003a), process accountability and information quality (Libby et 
al. 2004), BSC training (Dilla and Steinbart, 2005), and involvement in BSC 
design, and describing the BSC as a causal chain (Tayler 2010).  Additional 
biases that have been found to manifest in BSC-based performance evaluations 
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include the actor-observer attribution bias (Wong-on-Wing et al. 2007) and the 
negativity bias (Kaplan et al. 2011).  
When evaluators are not provided with sufficient information cognitive 
limitations have been found to result in cognitive biases and non-normative 
behavior.  For example, Banker et al. (2004) also found evidence of the common 
measure bias.  However, they find that this bias is mitigated when evaluators are 
provided with additional information (i.e., a narrative and graphical representation 
(strategy map) of a business unit’s strategy).  Wong-on-Wing et al. (2007) 
examined the effect of requiring both supervisors and subordinates to assess the 
quality (validity) of a strategy as a means of reducing conflict in BSC-based 
performance evaluations.  Consistent with Banker et al. (2004), all participants in 
their study were provided with a strategy map showing the causal linkages among 
the BSC elements and BSC results for two stores.  The pattern of BSC results 
indicated that both stores exceeded targets in the Learning & Growth and Internal 
Processes perspectives and both stores fell below targets in the Customer and 
Financial perspectives.  However, Store B’s performance was superior to Store 
A’s performance on all strategically-linked measures (i.e., Store B exceeded the 
strategically-linked targets in the Learning & Growth and Internal Processes 
perspectives more than Store A and was less negative on the strategically-linked 
Customer and Financial targets than Store A).  Wong-on-Wing et al. designed 
their study so that participants would infer poor divisional performance by 
“presenting across two stores, a consistent pattern of performance suggesting 
weak linkages between driver and outcome measures” (p. 8).  Further, participants 
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were informed that the store managers were recently hired to execute the new 
strategy.   
Wong-on-Wing et al. (2007) interpret their findings to reflect a supervisor 
(observer) bias, but not a subordinate (actor) bias, when evaluating subordinate 
performance with respect to achievement of the BSC strategy.  However, the 
pattern of results presented to participants may not have been reflective of weak 
linkages between drivers and outcomes (particularly with respect to Store B).  
Rather, the pattern may have suggested strong linkages between drivers and 
outcomes, but given that the strategy was new, an insufficient amount of time had 
elapsed for the improvement in the leading measures to be reflected in financial 
performance.  In the absence of an explicit strategy implementation timeline it is 
not clear whether supervisors relied on non-strategically-linked measures and/or 
strategically-linked measures beyond the controllable timeline of the subordinate 
when conducting the performance evaluations.  This appears to be a major 
limitation of their study.   
STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE 
 
Timing between lead and lag performance measures.  Kaplan and 
Norton (1996, p. 17) assert that an essential benefit from BSC implementation is 
an understanding of the link between the timing and magnitude of the levers 
managers control and future financial performance (Banker et al. 2000).  Further, 
Atkinson (2006) claims that a critical element in the usefulness of the BSC in 
guiding strategic improvement is recognition that an adequate amount of time 
must elapse between the implementation of a strategic initiative and the 
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determination of whether the strategy has been successful.  Field studies 
conducted over the past decade have provided evidence of temporal lags of 
various lengths between improvement in leading, nonfinancial measures and 
improved financial performance (e.g., Banker et al. 2000; Davis and Albright 
2004; Ittner and Larcker 1998).2  Moreover, Kaplan and Norton (2001) provide 
numerous anecdotal examples in which BSC adopting organizations see 
improvement in financial performance within 12 – 24 months after the BSC has 
been implemented.3  Despite the importance of timing considerations in BSC 
implementation and BSC-based performance evaluations, and evidence that time 
lags exist, it is surprising that prior research has not explicitly examined the effect 
of providing managers with a strategy implementation timeline. 
Banker et al. (2000) highlights the importance of communicating 
information regarding the relationship between the timing and magnitude of 
leading and lagged performance measures.  The managers in their study could 
receive a substantial bonus (up to 35 percent of base salary) prior to the 
implementation of a BSC-based incentive plan.  Further, they found only a six-
month lag between improvement in customer satisfaction and improved financial 
performance.  The authors inquired as to why the managers had not previously 
focused on sufficiently improving customer satisfaction and why, after the 
incorporation of customer service measures into the compensation plan, did both 
                                                 
2
 Ittner and Larcker (1998) and Banker et al. (2000) provide evidence of a six-month lag between 
improvement in measures of customer service and improvement in financial performance.  Davis 
and Albright (2004) show significant improvement in financial performance for BSC 
implementing branches within two years. 
3
 Kaplan and Norton (2001) note that in some cases this may take up to 36 months. 
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customer satisfaction and profit improve.  Interviews with the senior managers 
revealed that 
…although hotel managers were aware of the strategic importance of 
customer satisfaction for financial performance, they did not know either 
the timing or the magnitude of this relation.  Without such knowledge, 
managers did not recognize the true benefit of allocating more effort and 
resources to improve customer satisfaction…(pp. 89-90) 
 
Several researchers have recently commented on the absence of a BSC 
strategy implementation timeline in both research and practice (e.g., Ahn 2001; 
Bukh and Malmi 2005; Franco-Santos and Bourne 2005; Papalexandris et al. 
2005).  Further, Nørreklit (2000, p. 71), in a broad critique of the BSC’s 
theoretical foundations, notes, “If a cause-and-effect relationship requires a time 
lag between cause and effect, then it is problematic that the time dimension is not 
part of the scorecard.”  More recently, Kaplan (2009) commented on the absence 
of a strategy implementation timeline in the current conceptualization of the BSC: 
[S]trategy maps still represent a highly-aggravated view of the causal 
relationship among strategic objectives.  In order to make strategy maps 
more visually appealing to managers and employees, we have simplified 
the causal relationships assumed within the strategy map…A detailed 
systems dynamics model would incorporate causal linkages that have 




When managers are not provided with information regarding the timing between 
drivers and outcomes, they may not only fail to undertake appropriate strategic 
initiatives, but they may also base performance evaluations on measures beyond a 
subordinate’s time span of control. 
Controllability and responsibility accounting.  Controllability is the 
degree to which a specific manager’s action(s) influences the probability 
distribution of costs, revenues, or other items in question (Demski 1994).  
Increases in perceived controllability should lead to greater responsibility being 
attached to a manager for the consequences of her/his decisions (Ghosh 2005; 
Kelley and Michela 1980).  Conversely, decreases in perceived controllability 
should lead to less responsibility being attached to a manager for the 
consequences of her/his decisions.  Therefore, the higher the perceived control a 
manager has the higher (lower) they should be evaluated based on the positive 
(negative) outcomes resulting from their actions.  This concept is similar to 
responsibility accounting.  Under responsibility accounting managers should only 
be evaluated based on measures under their control.  Managers should not be 
rewarded for revenues which are not a result of their own efforts, nor should they 
be held responsible for costs which they cannot control (Wilson and Chua 1993). 
Consideration of the timing relationship between leading, nonfinancial 
measures and lagged financial performance is essential, not only in strategy 
implementation, but also in the performance evaluation of managers responsible 
for a strategy’s implementation.  Consistent with the concepts of controllability 
and responsibility accounting, a manager that is charged with implementing a 
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strategy should only be held responsible for outcomes that have been under 
her/his control.  In the context of this study, evaluators that are provided with a 
strategy map and implementation timeline are expected to evaluate subordinates 
based on strategically-linked measures that have been under the subordinates’ 
time span of control.  Evaluators that are not provided with this information are 
expected to evaluate subordinates based on non-strategically- and strategically-
linked performance measures, irrespective of whether or not they have been under 
the subordinates’ time span of control.  This prediction is formally stated as 
Hypothesis 1: 
H1a:   Evaluators provided with a strategy map and implementation 
timeline will base subordinates’ performance evaluations more on 
measures that are congruent with firm’s long-term strategy and that 
are under the subordinates’ time span of control compared to 
evaluators that are provided with a strategy map, but not an 
implementation timeline. 
H1b:   Evaluators provided with a strategy map and implementation 
timeline will base subordinates’ bonus allocations more on 
measures that are congruent with the firm’s long-term strategy and 
that are under the subordinates’ time span of control compared to 








“BUY-IN” TO THE CORPORATE STRATEGY 
  
A key factor in the successful implementation of a strategy is management 
and employee buy-in to the strategy.4  If lower-level employees buy-in to a BSC 
strategy they will have awareness of the strategy, perceive the causal linkages 
between drivers and outcomes to be valid, and be committed to improving 
performance on the leading measures of financial success.  In addition to these 
components, managers that buy-in to a BSC strategy will evaluate the 
performance of subordinates charged with implementing the strategy based on 
measures congruent with the strategy.   
Prior work highlights the importance of generating buy-in (e.g., see Barr 
2011 and Cokins 2005).  Further, Kaplan and Norton (2001, p. 217) list 
“develop[ing] buy-in to support the organization’s strategy” as the second of four 
steps in creating strategic awareness.  Organizations actively seek to persuade 
employees to buy-in to the organization’s vision, and a lack of employee buy-in 
(at all levels of the organization) can hinder successful implementation of a BSC 
(Kay 2009).  Recent studies have demonstrated the positive effects of generating 
components of buy-in at the management level, as well as the negative 
repercussions that may result when not generating it. 
For example, Banker et al. (2004) found that managers that were provided 
with narrative and graphical representations of the corporate strategy (strategy 
                                                 
4
 Buy-in is commonly divided into intellectual and emotional components.  Intellectual buy-in 
relates to individuals being aware of, and aligned with, key business issues and understanding how 
they can positively affect them.  Emotional buy-in relates to individuals’ commitment and 
engagement in the achievement of organizational goals.  Both components of buy-in are thought to 
be equally valuable (Thomson et al. 1999; Thomas and Hecker 2000). 
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maps) evaluated subordinates more on strategically-linked measures relative to 
non-linked measures.  Similarly, Libby et al. (2004) found that providing 
evaluating managers with a third-party assurance report signaling the reliability 
and relevance of the performance measures included in a BSC resulted in reliance 
on measures unique to a business unit in performance evaluations.  Further, Webb 
(2004) found that managers that perceived the causal linkages in a strategy to be 
valid were more willing to commit to both nonfinancial and financial goals than 
managers that did not perceive the causal linkages to be valid.  More recently, 
Guymon and Mitchell (2012) found that subordinates are more willing to accept 
risk when the linkage between the performance measures they will be evaluated 
on and the firm’s strategy is explained to them.  Specifically, they found that 
when managers use the firm’s strategy to explain the imposition of compensation 
risk in subordinates’ performance measures, the subordinates had increased 
beliefs regarding the informational justice that exists in the relationships between 
risk and the performance measures.  In turn, they found that higher levels of 
informational justice increased the amount of risk the subordinates were willing to 
accept, which led them to allocate greater effort.  Subordinates that received no 
explanation for the imposition of compensation risk had lower beliefs regarding 
informational justice and were not as willing to accept higher levels of risk. 
In contrast to these studies, which show positive implications of 
generating components of buy-in, Ittner et al. (2003a) demonstrates the negative 
consequences that may be attributable to not generating management buy-in.  
Ittner et al. found that the use of subjectivity in weighting BSC measures allowed 
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managers to ignore leading measures of strategy success in bonus allocation 
decisions.  Instead, managers primarily relied on financial measures and, in some 
instances, on measures that were not included in the BSC.  Though the managers 
were reported as having a good understanding of the BSC process, they clearly 
were not committed to it.  Consequently, the BSC-based incentive plan was 
replaced with a plan that focused on revenues.  More recently, Hibbets et al. 
(2012) found that managers were more likely to evaluate subordinates on 
measures that were common across divisions, as opposed to measures unique to a 
particular division, when they felt a particular division’s strategy did not 
adequately differentiate itself from the market conditions faced by a separate 
division of the same company. 
Based on these prior results, and in the context of this study, I predict that 
managers that buy-in to the corporate strategy will base their performance 
evaluations and bonus allocations on measures congruent with the firm’s long-
term strategy.  Conversely, managers that do not buy-in to the corporate strategy 
are predicted to not rely on strategically linked measures, and therefore, will base 
subordinates’ performance evaluations and bonus allocations on measures 
incongruent with the long-term strategy of the firm.  These predictions are 
formally stated as Hypothesis 2: 
H2a:   Evaluators that buy-in (do not buy-in) to the corporate strategy will 
base their performance evaluations of subordinates on measures 




H2b:   Evaluators that buy-in (do not buy-in) to the corporate strategy will 
base their bonus allocation decisions for subordinates on measures 
congruent (incongruent) with the firm’s long-term strategy. 
EXPERIENCE 
Participation in events or tasks associated with a particular area provides 
individuals with domain experience, which facilitates the creation of knowledge 
stored in memory (Libby 1995; Vera-Muñoz 2001; Victoravich 2010).  As 
individuals gain further domain experience they have greater access to knowledge 
structures stored in memory related to that domain (Vera- Muñoz, 2001).  Prior 
literature has shown that the application of knowledge gained through domain 
experience can improve performance on judgment and decision-making tasks 
(Bonner et al. 1997; Nelson 1993; Nelson et al. 1995; Victoravich 2010).  
However, the effect of experience on performance has been shown to be indirect.  
Specifically, experience directly affects knowledge, which then affects judgment 
and decision-making performance (Dearman and Shields 2001; Krumwiede et al. 
2011; Libby 1995; Vera-Muñoz 2001). 
Two recent studies have examined the effect of experience in BSC 
settings.  Griffth and Neely (2009) used a quasi-experiment to evaluate the impact 
of a BSC-related pay scheme on branch performance in a multinational distributor 
of heating and plumbing products.  Their results indicate that the use of a BSC 
only had a positive effect on branch performance when branch managers had 
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higher levels of experience.5  Specifically, the authors found that more 
experienced managers were better able to perform under the BSC compared to 
less experienced managers.  They conclude that the more experience a manager 
has, the greater his/her ability is to understand where to allocate their effort in 
order to achieve the greatest payoff (i.e., they have sufficient knowledge, gained 
through experience, to know how to best allocate their effort). 
Krumwiede et al. (2011) used a multi-period experimental setting to 
examine the effect of task outcome feedback and broad domain evaluation 
experience on the use of unique BSC scorecard measures.  They find that, when 
coupled with outcome feedback, managers with greater levels of broad domain 
experience place more weight on unique measures relative to managers with less 
experience.  Further, in post-experimental questioning they find that managers 
with greater broad domain experience found the unique measures to be more 
relevant in the evaluation process compared to managers with less experience.6  
This study demonstrates that broad domain experience can result in the 
sophisticated knowledge structures and procedural knowledge required to make 
better use of data in a BSC performance evaluation context. 
The findings of Griffith and Neely (2009) and Krumwiede et al. (2011) 
highlight a common finding in studies examining the effect of experience on 
judgment and decision-making tasks.  Specifically, more experienced individuals 
                                                 
5
 Griffith and Neely (2009) partition their sample at the median of 10-years of experience and 
found that all of the effect of the BSC was in the greater-than-10-years-experience group. 
6
 The “unique” measures used in this study were designed to capture the unique strategy of a 
particular division.  Given that the two divisions in the experiment had different strategies, the 
unique measures were more relevant in the performance evaluation relative to measures that were 
common across divisions. 
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possess the more highly developed knowledge structures and procedural 
knowledge required of them to be able to disregard irrelevant information, and 
thus, base their judgments and decisions on only relevant information (Bedard and 
Mock 1992; Bonner and Lewis 1990; Vera-Muñoz et al. 2001; Victoravich 2010).  
This is due, at least in part, to differences in how experts and novices search for 
information.  For example, research in auditing has found that while less 
experienced auditors examine information sequentially, which exposes them to 
irrelevant information, more experienced auditors use their knowledge to apply 
directed information search strategies aimed at acquiring only relevant 
information (Biggs et al. 1987; Biggs and Mock 1983; Bouwman 1984).  Shelton 
(1999), citing Shanteau (1993) and Lesgold et al. (1988) states:    
It is not necessarily the knowledge of what is relevant or irrelevant that 
distinguishes the expert’s judgment from the novice.  The expert tends to 
ignore irrelevant information while the novice seems unable to do so even 
when the irrelevancy of the information is recognized prior to making the 
decision.  (p. 219) 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, more experienced individuals that are 
provided with a strategy map and implementation timeline are expected to use this 
information to evaluate subordinates’ performance based on only relevant 
information.  In the context of this study, relevant information includes measures 
that are linked to the firm’s long-term strategy and that are under the 
subordinates’ time span of control.  Irrelevant information includes measures that 
are linked to the firm’s long-term strategy, but are beyond the subordinates’ time 
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span of control and/or non-strategically-linked measures.  Less experienced 
individuals are expected to evaluate subordinates’ performance on both relevant 
and irrelevant information, irrespective of whether or not they receive an 
implementation timeline.  This prediction is formally stated as Hypothesis 3: 
H3a:   Evaluators with higher levels of experience that are provided with 
a strategy map and implementation timeline will base 
subordinates’ performance evaluations on relevant information 
while evaluators with lower levels of experience will base 
subordinates’ performance evaluations on both relevant and 
irrelevant information, irrespective of whether or not they receive 
an implementation timeline. 
H3b:   Evaluators with higher levels of experience that are provided with 
a strategy map and implementation timeline will base 
subordinates’ bonus allocations on relevant information while 
evaluators with lower levels of experience will base subordinates’ 
bonus allocations on both relevant and irrelevant information, 




Affect, which is a general term used to describe both moods and emotions, 
is considered to be an integral component of judgment and decision-making 
(Slovic 2000).  In fact, decisions based solely on cognition (in the absence of 
affect) are considered uncommon (Forgas 1995; Iyer et al. 2012).  Therefore, 
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decision-making behavior cannot be fully understood unless both cognition and 
affect are jointly considered (Ding and Beaulieu 2009; Iyer et al. 2012; Kida et al. 
2001; LeDoux 1996).  Rational decision-making requires both deliberate analysis 
and affective input.  However, affect can take precedence over deliberate analysis 
in the decision-making process because it requires less effort, and therefore, is 
more efficient (Damasio et al. 1990; Epstein 1994; Lowenstein et al. 2001).  
Prior research has historically separated affect into orthogonal valence 
states of positive and negative affective states (Chung et al. 2008, 2011; Cianci 
and Bierstaker 2009; George and Jones 1997; Iyer et al. 2012; Stone and Kadous 
1997).  Positive affect (positive feeling states) can facilitate flexible, effective 
problem solving, decision-making, thinking, and evaluations of events 
irrespective of whether the positive affect is naturally occurring or induced 
(Aspinwall and Taylor 1992; Estrada et al. 1997; Isen 1999; Taylor and Aspinwall 
1996; Weiss et al. 1999).  Positive affect can also result in more creative problem 
solving through the use of broader categories and flexible schemas in sorting 
information (Chung et al. 2008; Isen and Daubman 1984).  While higher levels of 
creativity and flexible thinking may be desirable in some situations (e.g., artistic 
or entrepreneurial endeavors), it can have more of a detrimental effect in others.  
For example, in auditing decisions consensus is often used as a measure of 
decision quality.  Chung et al. (2008) found that auditors in a positive affect 
condition exhibited more creativity in an inventory valuation task, and therefore, 
had lower levels of consensus on inventory values than auditors in neutral or 
negative affect conditions. 
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According to the mood maintenance theory, individuals experiencing 
positive affect are interested in maintaining their positive mood state (Isen and 
Simmonds 1978; Wegener and Petty 1994, 1996).  This can result in individuals 
in a positive mood avoiding stimuli that can alter their mood state (Mackie and 
Worth 1989).  Therefore, these individuals can become overly reliant on heuristic 
thought, which can reduce efforts to seek out and consider other, potentially more 
promising alternatives (Baron et al. 2012; Klayman et al. 1999).  This can be 
particularly problematic in tasks that involve effortful, detailed, and systematic 
thinking (Schwarz and Bless 1991).  In a performance evaluation context, the 
mood maintenance approach of positive-mood individuals may lead them to avoid 
difficult and unpleasant situations.  Thus, they may be less likely to make 
judgments and decisions that could have negative implications for others (e.g., 
evaluating one individual less favorably than another) (Connelly et al. 2004). 
Negative affect (negative feeling states) can interrupt information 
processing, and therefore, decrease processing capacity (Eysenck 1982; Sarason 
1975; Simon 1967).  Negative affect requires attention, which can reduce the 
amount of attention available for task-related information processing (Stone and 
Kadous 1997).  This opens the door for extraneous thoughts to enter the mind, 
which can detract from thoughts that are necessary to the successful performance 
of the task at hand (Raghunathan and Pham 1999; Seibert and Ellis 1991).  
Therefore, individuals experiencing negative affect may also rely on heuristic 
decision strategies, which may result in lower task performance.  In an experiment 
using undergraduate students as participants, Stone and Kadous (1997, p. 171) 
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found that high negative affect resulted “in decision makers acquiring more 
information and processing individual pieces of information faster compared with 
conditions of low negative affect.”  Consequently, participants with higher levels 
of negative affect that were facing a relatively more difficult decision spent less 
time examining the most important attributes of the choice problem compared to 
participants facing a relatively easier decision.  The authors conclude that it is 
essential to, at a minimum, control for individual affective states when 
manipulating task-related variables. 
Negative affect can also make individuals reticent to make a decision.  
Individuals experiencing negative affect may anticipate that poor decisions will 
result in future unpleasant outcomes and feelings (Connelly et al. 2004; Iyer et al. 
2012; Kida et al. 2001; Loewenstein et al. 2001).  Therefore, these individuals 
tend to take the course of least resistance or avoid making a decision at all 
(Anderson 2003; Lerner and Keltner 2000).  For example, Sawyer (2005) found 
that negative affect increases as a task becomes more difficult, which leads to a 
desire to avoid making a decision altogether.  Specifically, the executive MBA 
students in her experiment that were faced with a more challenging decision task 
(more ambiguous capital investment decision) experienced higher levels of 
negative affect compared to participants in a less challenging decision task.  
Those participants with higher levels of negative affect exhibited a significantly 
stronger desire to avoid making a decision (choice avoidance).  In a performance 
evaluation context, individuals experiencing higher levels of negative affect may 
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be more likely to avoid making a difficult decision (evaluating one individual less 
favorably than another) because it can lead to unpleasant outcomes or feelings. 
Higher levels of both positive and negative affect have been shown to lead 
to choice avoidance behavior, particularly when a choice is difficult.  Whereas 
individuals with positive affect may not want to “spoil their good mood,” 
individuals with negative affect do not want to worsen theirs or experience 
additional components of negative affect.  Therefore, individuals experiencing 
higher levels of positive or negative affect are predicted to be more likely to avoid 
making a difficult decision (evaluating one subordinate less favorably than 
another) compared to individuals experiencing relatively lower levels of positive 
or negative affect.  Thus, the following is the fourth hypothesis: 
H4a:   Evaluators with higher (lower) levels of positive affect will exhibit 
more (less) choice avoidance in subordinates’ performance 
evaluations. 
H4b: Evaluators with higher (lower) levels of negative affect will exhibit 
more (less) choice avoidance in subordinates’ performance 
evaluations. 
H4c:   Evaluators with higher (lower) levels of positive affect will exhibit 
more (less) choice avoidance in allocating subordinates’ bonuses. 
H4d: Evaluators with higher (lower) levels of negative affect will exhibit 
more (less) choice avoidance in allocating subordinates’ bonuses. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study utilizes a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design.  Strategy 
implementation timeline was manipulated at two levels (no timeline provided; 
timeline provided).  Buy-in was also manipulated at two levels (low; high).  
Experience was a measured variable and categorized into two levels as described 
below.  Affect was included as a covariate in the testing of Hypotheses 1 – 3 and 
as a partitioned variable (“high” vs. “low” positive affect and “high” vs. “low” 
negative affect) to test Hypothesis 4. 
PARTICIPANTS 
Participants in the study were 86 evening MBA students from a major 
metropolitan university that were enrolled in a management accounting course. 7  
Prior experimental BSC research has commonly used MBA students as 
participants (e.g., Banker et al. 2004; Kaplan et al. 2011; Libby et al. 2004; Lipe 
and Salterio 2000, 2001; Webb 2004; Wong-on-Wing et al. 2007).  Therefore, the 
results of this study allow for a legitimate comparison of findings across prior 
experimental BSC research.  Participants ranged in age from 22 to 56 years old 
with an average of 30.7 years and 24.4-percent of the participants were female. 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
The experimental case used in this study was adapted from those used by 
Lipe and Salterio (2000, 2002), Banker et al. (2004), Wong-on-Wing et al. (2007), 
and Kaplan et al. (2011).  The case was based on a hypothetical high-end retail 
                                                 
7
 The Balanced Scorecard had not been covered in class prior to the experiment. 
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organization, which was patterned after an actual high-end leading retailer.  Many 
of the actual company’s strategic objectives were included in the experimental 
BSC materials.  Participants assumed the role of a divisional manager rating the 
performance of two different store managers that report to the divisional manager.  
The two store managers were each responsible for the performance of one of two 
retail stores in the same metropolitan area (the North Store and the South Store).  
The stores were described as being located in nearly identical socio-economic 
areas and catered to clientele that were demographically similar.  Each participant 
performed performance evaluations and bonus allocations for both store managers 
(North and South).  At the end of the case, participants were asked standard 
demographic questions (age, gender, academic background, current emphasis of 
study, undergraduate degree, and current/past employment) to control for any 
cross-sectional differences.  Further, they responded to manipulation checks and 
questions regarding the perceived realism, understandability, and difficulty of the 
case materials.  Eighty-eight percent of participants found the task realistic and 
96.5 percent understood the case.  The mean rating for task difficulty was 3.52 (1 
= “very easy” and 7 = “very difficult”). 
MANIPULATED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Strategy Implementation Timeline.  A strategy implementation timeline 
was manipulated between subjects.  All participants received a strategy map 
patterned after Banker et al. (2004) (see Figure 1).  In addition to the strategy 
map, one-half of the participants were randomly assigned to receive a strategy 
implementation timeline, which was shown below the strategy map.  The case 
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materials for participants in the strategy implementation timeline condition 
described the strategy as requiring two to three years, on average, for results to 
fully manifest.  Specifically, it took an average of 22 months overall for the 
strategy to result in improvement in three causally-linked nonfinancial areas and 
an average of 30 months overall for improvement in the leading measures to be 
reflected in financial performance.  However, the case also indicated that the 
strategy had been implemented at each of the two stores only 18 months 
previously, at the same time each of the two store managers were promoted to 
their current position and charged with implementing the strategy.  Therefore, at 
neither store had the new strategy been in place long enough for improvement in 
leading, nonfinancial measures to be fully reflected in financial performance (i.e., 
achievement of the financial performance targets was beyond the store managers’ 
time span of control). 
 The BSC contained 16 measures spread evenly across the four BSC 
perspectives:  Learning and Growth, Internal Processes, Customer, and Financial 
(see Figure 2).  Each perspective contained two measures that were explicitly 
linked to the strategy map (relevant) and two that are not (irrelevant).  The 
following patterns of performance across the four BSC perspectives were 
embedded in the case as follows:8 
1. Learning and Growth perspective:  The North Store clearly 
exceeded, and the South Store fell below, the two strategically linked 
measures, while the South Store clearly exceeded, and the North Store 
                                                 
8
 The amount of time for improvement in each perspective was kept constant (6 to 9 months) to 
reduce the cognitive load placed on participants. 
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fell below, the two non-strategically linked measures.  The 
implementation timeline for phase one of the strategic plan was 6 to 9 
months (average of 7.5 months).  Therefore, the strategic timeline 
called for a minimum of 6 months, and an average of 7.5 months, 
following the initial implementation of the strategy to achieve 
measurable success on the first set of strategically linked target goals. 
2. Internal Processes perspective:  The North Store clearly exceeded, 
and the South Store fell below, the two strategically linked measures, 
while the South Store clearly exceeded, and the North Store fell below, 
the two non-strategically linked measures.  The implementation 
timeline for phase two of the strategic plan was an additional 6 to 9 
months (average 7.5 months).  Therefore, the strategic timeline called 
for a minimum of 12 months, and an average of 15 months, following 
the initial implementation of the strategy to achieve measurable 
success on the second set of strategically linked target goals. 
3. Customer perspective:  The North Store slightly exceeded, and the 
South Store fell slightly below, the two strategically linked measures, 
while the South Store exceeded the North Store on the two non-
strategically linked measures.  The implementation timeline for phase 
three was an additional 6 to 9 months (average of 7.5 months).  
Therefore, the strategic timeline called for a minimum of 18 months, 
and an average of 22.5 months, following the initial implementation of 
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the strategy to achieve measurable success on the third set of 
strategically linked target goals. 
4. Financial perspective:  The South Store clearly exceeded, and the 
North Store clearly fell below, the two strategically linked measures, 
while the North Store clearly exceeded the South Store on the two 
non-strategically linked measures.  The implementation timeline for 
the final phase of the strategy was an additional 6 to 9 months 
(average 7.5 months).  Therefore, the strategic timeline called for a 
minimum of 24 months, and an average of 30 months, following the 
initial implementation of the strategy to achieve measurable success on 
the strategy’s lagged financial performance goals. 
With the strategy map and implementation timeline, the store managers 
should have only been held responsible for their performance on the Learning and 
Growth and Internal Processes measures, as they were the only measures clearly 
within the store managers’ 18-month time span of control.  It was possible, under 
the most favorable conditions, for the store managers’ to be held responsible for 
the Customer measures.  However, improvement in the Financial measures was 
clearly outside of the store manager’s time span of control as they required a 
minimum of 24 months for improvement subsequent to the strategy being 
implemented. 
Within each BSC perspective, the sum of the variance (difference between 
actual results and target results) was offset between the stores for each 
perspective; with the sum of the variance across both stores for each perspective 
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equaling zero, and therefore, the aggregate sum of the variance equaling zero.  
The variances were constructed in this manner so that participants that failed to 
attend to the strategy would evaluate the store manager’s performance as 
equivalent.  However, if a participant (a) attended to the strategy implementation 
timeline and (b) bought-in in to the strategy, they would evaluate the North Store 
manager more positively than they would evaluate the South Store manager. 
Buy-in.  Buy-in to the corporate strategy was manipulated between 
subjects.  Participants were randomly assigned to either a “high buy-in” or “low 
buy-in” condition.  The case materials indicated that the company pilot-tested the 
strategy prior to rolling it out company wide.  In the high (low) condition the 
pilot-test stores achieved a 100-percent (50-percent) success rate (i.e., the degree 
to which stores met financial performance targets).  Further, in the high (low) 
condition the case indicated that stores that implemented the strategy subsequent 
to pilot-testing experienced a 95-percent (60-percent) success rate. 
 Thomson and Hecker (2000) describe communication as being essential 
when attempting to generate buy-in.  Thomson et al. (1999, p. 830) found that 
“people with high levels of buy-in rate their company’s communication highly, 
and those with low levels generally rate communication as average or poor.”  
Kaplan and Norton (2001) emphasize the necessity of communication and 
commitment from executive level management when designing and implementing 
a BSC.  In discussing the generation of buy-in, they list quarterly town meetings, 
brochures, monthly newsletters, education programs, and the company intranet as 
ways an executive team can communicate a strategy and BSC to all levels of the 
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organization, as well as demonstrate a high level of commitment.  Therefore, case 
materials for participants in the high buy-in condition also described the executive 
management team’s communication and commitment as follows: 
CEO Michael Reynolds is a strong proponent of the new corporate 
strategy and accompanying Balanced Scorecard.  He has taken the 
following steps to ensure its success: 
• He has had various members of the corporate executive team 
that developed the Balanced Scorecard visit every store prior to 
implementing the strategy.  These executives hold meetings 
with all employees of the implementing store, fully explain the 
strategy and Balanced Scorecard to the employees, and hand 
out brochures that describe the strategic objectives and how 
they will be measured.  They also answer any questions the 
employees may have. 
• He assigned Brandon Lewis, a business performance analyst at 
eXclusivity, to oversee the deployment of the Balanced 
Scorecard full-time. 
• He has required the Balanced Scorecard to be made highly 
visible to all employees by having it posted in all break rooms, 
employee manuals, and on the company’s intranet. 
• He also required that the company’s intranet have voice and 
video segments of the corporate executive team describing the 
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overall strategy and explanations for individual objectives, 
measures, targets, and initiatives. 
• He has made the strategy and Balanced Scorecard an integral 
part of the orientation process for all new employees. 
• He requires the company’s newsletter to provide periodic 
reports on stores that have implemented the Balanced 
Scorecard and share success stories from top-performing 
managers. 
Case materials for participants in the low buy-in condition described the 
executive team’s degree of communication and commitment as follows: 
When eXclusivity began rolling out the new strategy three years ago a 
memo was sent out to all employees stating what the strategy was and 
when each store would begin implementing it.  When the stores you 
oversee began implementing the new strategy 18 months ago you received 
an additional memo which contained the strategy and Balanced Scorecard.  
The memo requested that you review the strategy with store managers you 
oversee and that they, in turn, review the strategy with their employees. 
 
 While the sum of the variance (difference between actual results and target 
results) was offset between the stores for each perspective, with the sum of the 
variance across both stores for each perspective equaling zero, the North Store 
manager performed significantly better overall on the strategically linked 
measures.  Specifically, the North Store manager’s sum of variance for 
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strategically linked measures was 39.2% while the South Store manager’s was -
39.3%.  Participants who understood and bought-in to the strategy should have 
evaluated the store managers based on strategically-linked measures.  In turn, 
these participants were expected to evaluate the North Store manager more 
favorably than the South Store manager. 
MEASURED INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Experience.   Participants were asked to respond to four primary 
questions regarding their prior experience.  Specifically, participants were asked 
to respond to the following questions:  (1) Their number of years of full-time 
professional work experience, (2) The number of years they have had experience 
working with the BSC, (3) If they have evaluated subordinates on both financial 
and nonfinancial measures in the past, and if so, the weight placed on each type of 
measure, and (4) if they are personally evaluated on both financial and 
nonfinancial measures, and if so, the weight placed on each type of measure.  
Each of these measures are discussed in the results section below. 
CONTROL VARIABLE 
 
Affect.  Participants completed the PANAS scale (Positive Affect 
Negative Affect Schedule) developed by Watson and Tellegan (1985).  A 
principal components factor analysis was conducted with the selection criterion 
being the retention of variables with eigenvalues ≥ 1.00 and factor loadings ≥ 









 Each participant rated the performance of each store manager (North and 
South).  Participants were presented with the following prompt: “As divisional 
manager, please indicate, on the following scale, your evaluation of the 
performance of the North (South) Store manager, Alex Kluger (Kurt Holmgren) 
over the past eighteen months.”  Participants responded on an 11-point scale (0 = 
Extremely Poor; 10 = Excellent).  Further, participants were asked to make a 
bonus allocation decision by responding to the following: “As divisional manager 
you are responsible not only for evaluating the performance of the store managers 
under your supervision, but also for allocating their bonuses from a pool.  You 
have a pool of $50,000 to allocate between Alex Kluger (North Store manager) 
and Kurt Holmgren (South Store manager).  Please allocate the $50,000 between 
these two store managers by writing their bonus amounts in the space provided.”  
The difference in performance evaluation scores (North minus South) and bonus 





CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
MANIPULATION CHECKS 
 
 Participants responded to four manipulation check/attentiveness questions.  
The first question asked participants to respond to the following, “Without 
looking back at any prior information, please use the following scale to indicate 
how successful you believe the new eXclusivity corporate strategy will be in 
meeting competitive challenges.  That is, please indicate the degree to which you 
feel that by following the corporate strategy eXclusivity stores will be able to 
grow same-store sales and net sales margins (to what degree to you “buy-in” to 
the corporate strategy?)”  Participants responded to this question on an 11 point 
scale (0 = “Very Unlikely” and 10 = “Very Likely”).  The mean response for 
participants in the high (low) buy-in condition was 7.08 (5.94).  The difference in 
these means (1.14) is statistically significant (t = 2.808, p = 0.003, one-tailed).  
Therefore, participants in the high buy-in condition appear to have “bought-in” to 
the strategy more than those in the low buy-in condition.  However, as discussed 
in the results section, the mean scores in both cases are greater than the scalar 
mid-point of 5. 
 The second question participants responded to was, “Without looking back 
at any prior information, please respond to the following question:  I was provided 
with an explicit detailed timeline which showed how long it should take for the 
eXclusivity corporate strategy to play out as well as how long it should take for 
improvement in one category to lead to improvement in the subsequent category.”  
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Participants responded by either circling “True” or “False.”  Eight participants 
failed this manipulation check, and thus, were eliminated from the analysis. 
 The third (fourth) question asked participants to respond to the following, 
“Without looking back at any prior information, please respond to the following 
questions:  How long has Alex Kluger (Kurt Holmgren) been manager of the 
North (South) Store?”  Participants circled either 6 months, 18 months, or 30 
months.  Seven participants responded by circling 30 months for one or both 
managers, and thus, were eliminated from the analysis.  In total 15 participants 
(17.9 percent) failed manipulation checks/attentiveness questions and were 
eliminated from the analysis.9 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
 
Strategy Implementation Timeline.  An Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) was used to test Hypotheses 1 – 3.  Hypothesis 1a predicts that, when 
provided with a strategy map and implementation timeline, store managers’ 
performance evaluations will be based on strategically-linked measures within the 
managers’ controllable timeline.  Specifically, evaluators that are provided with a 
strategy map and implementation timeline are expected to rate the performance of 
a store manager that has met strategically-linked, nonfinancial targets within the 
controllable timeline, but has not met lagged financial targets beyond the 
controllable timeline (the North Store manager) more favorably than the 
performance of a manager who has not met strategically-linked, nonfinancial 
targets within the controllable timeline, but has met lagged financial performance 
                                                 
9
 The results are inferentially similar when the dropped participants are included in the analysis. 
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targets beyond the controllable timeline (the South Store manager).  Evaluators 
that are not provided with an implementation timeline are expected to base 
subordinates’ performance evaluations on non-strategically- and strategically-
linked performance measures, irrespective of whether or not they were within the 
subordinates’ time span of control.  Consequently, this latter group is expected to 
evaluate the North and South Store managers equivalently and/or to evaluate the 
South Store manager more favorably than the North Store manager.  Table 1, 
Panel A and Table 2, Panel A show that this hypothesis was supported (F = 5.672, 
p = 0.020 in Table 1 and F = 6.532, p = 0.013 in Table 2)10.  Table 1 (2), Panel B 
shows that when participants were provided with a strategy implementation 
timeline the North Store manager’s performance evaluation exceeded, on average, 
the South Store manager’s performance evaluation by 1.998 (2.065).  When 
participants were not provided with a strategy implementation timeline this 
difference was only 0.591 (0.568). 
Hypothesis 1b predicts that, when provided with a strategy 
implementation timeline, store manager’s bonus allocations will be based on 
whether or not they met strategically-linked measures within the controllable 
timeline.  Specifically, evaluators that are provided with a strategy map and 
implementation timeline are expected to award larger bonus amounts to the North 
Store manager than the South Store manager.  Evaluators that are not provided 
with an implementation timeline are expected award an equal amount of bonus to 
the North and South Store managers and/or award a larger amount of bonus to the 
                                                 
10
 As described in the results section on experience below, there were two sets of results to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 since two different measures of experience were used. 
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South Store manager.  Table 3, Panel A and Table 4, Panel A show that this 
hypothesis was also supported (F = 7.107, p = 0.010 in Table 3 and F = 8.834, p = 
0.004 in Table 4).  Table 3 (4), Panel B shows that when participants were 
provided with a strategy implementation timeline the average amount of bonus 
awarded to the North Store manager exceeded the average amount of bonus 
awarded to the South Store manager by $10,433 ($10,883).  When participants 
were not provided with a strategy implementation timeline this difference was 
only $1,486 ($1,104). 
“Buy-in” to the Corporate Strategy.  Hypothesis 2a predicts that 
evaluators that are in the high (low) buy-in condition will base their performance 
evaluations on strategically-linked (non-strategically-linked) measures.  
Therefore, high (low) buy-in participants are expected to evaluate the North 
(South) Store manager higher than the South (North) Store manager.  Table 1, 
Panel A and Table 2, Panel A show that this hypothesis was not supported (F = 
0.037, p = 0.849 in Table 1 and F = 0.227, p = 0.635 in Table 2).  Table 1 (2), 
Panel C shows that participants in the high buy-in condition rated, on average, the 
North Store manager 1.238 (1.456) points higher than the South Store manager.  
Participants in the low buy-in condition rated, on average, the North Store 
manager 1.350 (1.178) points higher than the South Store manager.   
Hypothesis 2b predicts that evaluators that are in the high (low) buy-in 
condition will base subordinates’ bonus allocation decisions on strategically-
linked (non-strategically-linked) performance measures.  Therefore, participants 
in the high (low) buy-in condition are expected to award a larger amount of bonus 
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to the North (South) Store manager compared to the South (North) Store manager.  
Table 3, Panel A and Table 4, Panel A show that this hypothesis was also not 
supported (F = 0.036, p = 0.850 in Table 3 and F = 0.569, p = 0.454 in Table 4).  
Table 3 (4), Panel C shows that on average, participants in the high buy-in 
condition awarded the North Store manager $6,276 ($7,230) more in bonus than 
the South Store manager.  In the low buy-in condition, this difference was $5,643 
($4,757).  It is important to note that Hypotheses 2a and 2b were not supported 
given that the buy-in manipulation appeared to be effective (as described in the 
“Manipulation Checks” section above).  However, even though participants in the 
high buy-in condition bought-in to the strategy more than participants in the low 
buy-in condition, the low buy-in participants had an average buy-in rating of 5.94 
on an 11-point scale, which is higher than the scalar mid-point of 5.  One 
explanation as to why this hypothesis may not have been supported is because, on 
average, all participants appear to have bought-in to the strategy to some degree. 
Experience.  Participants’ responses to each of the four experience 
questions described in the methods section were analyzed.  Participants had an 
average (median) of 7.1 (5.0) years of full-time professional work experience and 
0.67 (0.00) years of experience working with the BSC.  Only 22 (30.6-percent) 
participants had experience evaluating subordinates on both financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures.  Thirty-four (47.9-percent) participants had 




Hypothesis 3a and 3b were not supported when using years of BSC 
experience as an experience measure (F = 2.571, p = 0.114 and F = .0121, p = 
0.729 for Hypotheses 3a and 3b, respectively).  These hypotheses were also not 
supported when using experience evaluating subordinates on multiple dimensions 
as an experience measure (F = 0.014, p = 0.905 and F = 0.015, p = 0.903 for 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b, respectively).  These results are largely due to the lack of 
statistically meaningful variance within these measures as well as a lack of 
statistical power.  For example, when using experience evaluating subordinates on 
multiple dimensions as an experience measure only 8 participants were in the cell 
“no timeframe, experienced.”  As described below, Hypothesis 3 was supported 
when using years of full-time professional work experience and experience being 
personally evaluated on both financial and nonfinancial measures as experience 
measures. 
To distinguish relatively high experience from low experience the median 
value of 5 years of full-time professional work experience was used as the cutoff.  
Participants in the “low experience” category had five years or less of experience 
(mean = 4.1 years) and participants in the “high experience” category had more 
than five years of experience (mean = 10.1 years).  This difference between 
means is statistically significant (t = 10.544, two-tailed p = 0.000).  The low 
(high) experience group had an average of 0.78 (0.67) years of experience 
working with the BSC.  This difference is not statistically significant (t = 0.340, 
two-tailed p = 0.735). 
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As mentioned above, 34 (47.9-percent) participants had experience being 
personally evaluated on both financial and nonfinancial performance measures.  
Experienced (inexperienced) participants had an average of 6.5 (7.8) years of full-
time professional experience.  This difference was not significant (t = -1.395, two-
tailed p = 0.168).  Experienced (inexperienced) participants had an average of 1.1 
(0.38) years of experience working with the BSC.  This difference is statistically 
significant (t = 2.319, two-tailed p = 0.023). 
Hypothesis 3a predicts an interaction between strategy implementation 
timeline and experience.  Specifically, this hypothesis predicts that more 
experienced participants that are provided with a strategy implementation timeline 
will base subordinates’ performance evaluations on relevant (strategically-linked 
measures within the controllable timeline) information and will disregard 
irrelevant (strategically-linked measures beyond the controllable timeline and 
non-strategically-linked measures) information.  Therefore, more experienced 
participants that are provided with an implementation timeline are expected to 
rate the performance of the North Store manager higher than the South Store 
manager.  Less experienced participants are expected to base subordinates’ 
performance evaluations on both relevant and irrelevant information, irrespective 
of whether or not they receive an implementation timeline.  Therefore, less 
experienced participants are expected to rate the North and South Store managers 
equivalently.  
Table 1, Panel A shows that, when using years of full-time professional 
work experience as an experience measure, this hypothesis is supported (F = 
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4.005, p = 0.050).  These results are displayed graphically in Figure 4.  To further 
evaluate the significance of this interaction, simple effect tests were conducted.  
The average amount by which the North Store manager’s performance was rated 
higher than that of the South Store manager’s was significantly different for more 
experienced participants based on whether or not they received a strategy 
implementation timeline (3.066 and 0.478 for timeline and no timeline, 
respectively; F = 9.427, p = 0.003) (Table 1, Panel C).  This difference was also 
significant between more experienced and less experienced participants when 
both groups received a strategy implementation timeline (3.066 and 0.929 for 
more experienced and less experienced participants, respectively; F = 6.177, p = 
0.016).  The average amount by which the North Store manager’s performance 
was rated higher than that of the South Store manager’s did not differ for less 
experienced participants, irrespective of whether they were provided with a 
strategy implementation timeline or not (0.929 and 0.704 for timeline and no 
timeline, respectively; F = 0.075, p = 0.786).  Further decomposition of this 
interaction reveals that the average performance evaluation of the North Store 
manager (8.250) was significantly higher than the average performance evaluation 
of the South Store manager (5.184) for more experienced participants that were 
provided with a strategy implementation timeline (F = 22.43, p = 0.000).  
However, when more experienced participants were not provided with a strategy 
implementation timeline the average performance evaluation of the North Store 
manager (6.927) was not significantly different than the average performance 
evaluation of the South Store manager (6.449) (F = 0.803, p = 0.374).  The 
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average amount by which the North Store Manager was rated higher than the 
South Store Manager did not differ significantly between less experienced 
participants, irrespective of whether or not they received an implementation 
timeline. 
Hypothesis 3a is also supported when experience being personally 
evaluated on both financial and nonfinancial performance measures is used as an 
experience measure (F = 7.202, p = 0.009) (Table 2, Panel A).  These results are 
displayed graphically in Figure 5.  The average amount by which the North Store 
manager was rated higher than the South Store manager was significantly 
different for experienced participants based on whether or not they received an 
implementation timeline (3.150 and 0.042 for timeline and no timeline, 
respectively; F = 13.055, p = 0.001) (Table 2, Panel C).  This difference was also 
significant between experienced and inexperienced participants based on whether 
or not they received an implementation timeline (3.150 and 0.980 for experienced 
and inexperienced participants, respectively; F = 6.096, p = 0.016).  The average 
amount by which the North Store manager was rated higher than the South Store 
manager did not differ significantly for inexperienced participants, irrespective of 
whether or not they received an implementation timeline (0.980 and 1.095 for 
timeline and no timeline, respectively; F = 0.020, p = 0.889).  Experienced 
participants that received an implementation timeline rated the North Store 
manager significantly higher than the South Store manager (8.280 and 5.130 for 
the North Store and South Store managers, respectively; F = 24.125, p = 0.000).  
The North Store manager was not rated significantly higher than the South Store 
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manager was by experienced participants that did not receive an implementation 
timeline or by inexperienced participants, irrespective of whether or not they 
received an implementation timeline.  
The prediction for Hypothesis 3b is similar to that for Hypothesis 3a, but 
with bonus allocations as the dependent measure instead of performance 
evaluations.  Specifically, Hypothesis 3b predicts that more experienced managers 
that are provided with a strategy map and implementation timeline will base their 
bonus allocations on relevant information and disregard irrelevant information.  If 
this prediction holds, then these participants will award a significantly higher 
amount of bonus to the North Store manager than the South Store manager.  Less 
experienced participants are expected to base the store managers’ bonus 
allocations on both relevant and irrelevant information, irrespective of whether or 
not they receive an implementation timeline.  Therefore, these participants are 
expected to award an equivalent amount of bonus to the store managers. 
Table 3, Panel A shows that this hypothesis is supported when years of 
full-time professional work experience is used as the experience measure (F = 
5.127, p = 0.027).  These results are displayed graphically in Figure 6.  The 
average amount by which the North Store manager’s bonus exceeded that of the 
South Store manager’s was significantly different for more experienced 
participants depending on whether or not they were provided with a strategy 
implementation timeline ($14,335 and $-2,186 for timeline and no timeline, 
respectively; F = 11.927, p = 0.001) (Table 3, Panel C).  The average amount by 
which the North Store manager’s bonus exceeded the South Store manager’s did 
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not significantly differ for less experienced participants, irrespective of whether or 
not they were provided with a strategy implementation timeline ($6,512 and 
$5,157 for timeline and no timeline, respectively; F = 0.083, p = 0.774).  More 
experienced participants that were provided with an implementation timeline 
awarded a significantly higher amount of bonus to the North Store manager than 
the South Store manager ($32,172 and $17,818 for the North and South Store 
managers, respectively; F = 15.231, p = 0.000).  The amount of bonus awarded to 
the store managers by less experienced participants did not significantly differ, 
irrespective of whether or not they received an implementation timeline. 
When using prior experience being personally evaluated on both financial 
and nonfinancial measures as the measure of experience, Hypothesis 3b was also 
supported (F = 7.864, p = 0.007) (Table 4, Panel A).  The amount by which the 
North Store Manager’s bonus exceeded the South Store manager’s was 
significantly higher for experienced participants that received an implementation 
timeline compared to experienced participants that did not ($14,335 and -$2,186 
for timeline and no timeline, respectively; F = 15.847, p = 0.000) (Table 4, Panel 
C).  This difference was also significant between experienced and inexperienced 
participants, with both groups receiving an implementation timeline ($16,339 and 
$5,426 for experienced and inexperienced participants, respectively; F = 4.885, p 
= 0.031).  Experienced participants that received an implementation timeline 
award a significantly higher amount of bonus to the North Store manager than the 
South Store manager ($32,788 and $16,448 for the North and South Store 
managers, respectively; F = 20.562, p = 0.000).  The amount of bonus awarded to 
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the two store managers by experienced participants without an implementation 
timeline or by inexperienced participants, irrespective of whether or not they 
received an implementation timeline, did not significantly differ. 
Affect.  Both positive and negative affect have been shown to influence 
judgment and decision-making.  Therefore, participants’ affect was measured.  As 
described below, affect was used as a covariate in the testing of Hypotheses 1 – 3 
and as a partitioned variable to test Hypothesis 4.  After completing the case 
materials the participants filled out the PANAS scale (positive affect and negative 
affect schedule) developed by Watson and Tellegan (1985).  This scale has been 
shown to be internally consistent, reliable, and stable over time (Crawford and 
Henry 2004; Russel and Carroll 1999; Watson et al. 1988).  Participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which they experienced each of the twenty emotions 
listed on the PANAS scale on a five point Likert scale (Very Slightly or Not At All 
= 1, Extremely = 5) (see Figure 3).   
The affect factors were isolated using principal components factor analysis 
with varimax rotation and Kaiser correction.  The selection criterion was to retain 
variables with eigenvalues ≥ 1.00 and factor loadings ≥ 0.50.  Five factors that 
accounted for approximately 69 percent of the total variance were produced (see 
Table 5).  Two factors (Factors 1 and 4) are positive affect factors.  Factor 4 
loaded on the attributes of alert, attentive, and active.  It had a Cronbach’s alpha 
of 0.765, which indicates reasonable levels of scale reliability (Iacobucci and 
Duhachek 2003; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).  Factor 4 was significantly 
correlated (α = 0.01) with the performance evaluation difference score and was 
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marginally correlated (α = 0.10) with the bonus allocation difference score (see 
Table 6).  Therefore, it was included as a covariate in the ANCOVA models used 
to test Hypotheses 1 - 3.  Factor 1 loaded on the attributes of enthusiastic, excited, 
proud, inspired, determined, and strong.  However, this factor was not 
significantly correlated with either of the dependent measures and it did not yield 
significance in the ANCOVAs.  Therefore, it is not discussed further. 
Three negative affect factors resulted from the factor analysis (Factors 2, 
3, and 5 in Table 5).  Factor 3 loaded on the attributes of guilty, ashamed, and 
scared and had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.737.  This factor was marginally 
correlated with the performance evaluate difference score (α = 0.10) and was 
significantly correlated with the bonus allocation difference score (α = 0.01).  
Therefore, this factor was also included as a covariate in the testing of Hypotheses 
1 – 3.  Factor 2 (upset, irritable, distressed, and afraid) and Factor 5 (jittery and 
nervous) were not significantly correlated with the dependent measures and did 
not yield significance in the ANCOVAs.  Therefore, these factors are not 
discussed further. 
When testing Hypotheses 1 - 3 with the performance evaluation difference 
score as the dependent measure, Panel A in Tables 1 and 2 show that positive 
affect was significant as a covariate when both years of full-time professional 
experience (F = 7.253, p = 0.009) and experience being personally evaluated on 
both financial and nonfinancial performance measures (F = 14.870, p = 0.000) 
were used as experience measures.  With the same dependent measure being used, 
negative affect was significant as a covariate when years of professional 
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experience was used as an experience measure (F = 4.109, p = 0.047).  However, 
negative affect was not a significant covariate when prior experience being 
evaluated on both financial and nonfinancial measures was used as an experience 
measure (F = 0.331, p = 0.567).  This latter result may be explained by the 
marginal correlation that was found to exist between negative affect and the 
performance evaluation difference score. 
When using the bonus allocation difference score as the dependent 
measure in testing Hypotheses 1 – 3, Table 3, Panel A shows that positive affect 
was not a significant covariate when using years of full-time work experience as 
an experience measure (F = 1.386, p = 0.244).  This result may be explained by 
the marginal correlation that was found to exist between positive affect and the 
bonus allocation difference score.  Table 4, Panel A shows that positive affect was 
a significant covariate when using prior experience being evaluated on both 
financial and nonfinancial performance measures was used as an experience 
measure (F = 5.331, p = 0.024).  Using the same dependent measure, negative 
affect was found to be a significant covariate when both years of full-time 
professional work experience (F = 11.256, p = 0.001) and prior experience being 
evaluated on both financial and nonfinancial performance measures (F = 4.025, p 
= 0.049) were used as experience measures (see Panel A in Tables 3 and 4).  The 
results from including positive and negative affect as covariates reaffirm the call 
made by Stone and Kadous (1997) to consider the inclusion of individuals’ 
affective states as control variables in judgment and decision-making studies. 
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To test Hypothesis 4, positive and negative affect were partitioned.  
Specifically, the sum of individuals’ ratings on each of the attributes within Factor 
4 (positive affect) and Factor 3 (negative affect) were computed and split at the 
median point.  This resulted in the creation of “high” and “low” positive affect 
categories and “high” and “low” negative affect categories.  These groupings 
were then used in the testing of Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4a predicts that individuals with higher (lower) levels of 
positive affect will exhibit more (less) choice avoidance in subordinates’ 
performance evaluations.  Therefore, individuals with higher (lower) levels of 
positive affect are expected to evaluate the store managers equivalently 
(differently).  The effect of positive affect on the store managers’ performance 
evaluations was significant (F = 9.809, p = 0.003).  Participants with relatively 
higher levels of positive affect did not rate the North and South Store managers 
significantly different from each other (6.551 and 6.500 for the North and South 
Store managers, respectively; F = 0.041, p = 0.906).  However, participants with 
relatively lower positive affect did rate the North Store manager (7.757) higher 
than the South Store manager (5.729).  This difference is statistically significant 
(F = 19.589, p = 0.000).  Further, participants with lower levels of positive affect 
evaluated the North Store manager significantly higher than participants with 
higher positive affect (7.757 and 6.551 for lower and higher active positive affect, 
respectively; F = 8.715, p = 0.004).  Participants with higher levels of positive 
affect rated the South Store manager marginally higher than participants with 
lower levels of active positive affect (6.550 and 5.729 for higher and lower, 
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respectively; F = 3.470, p = 0.066).  Thus, Hypothesis 4a is supported.  
Specifically, participants with higher levels of positive affect were more reticent 
to make a decision when evaluating subordinates’ performance compared to 
participants with lower levels of positive affect. 
Hypothesis 4b predicts that individuals with higher (lower) levels of 
negative affect will exhibit more (less) choice avoidance in subordinates’ 
performance evaluations.  While there were some cells that individually had 
significance when performing this analysis, the effect of negative affect on the 
store managers’ performance evaluations was not significant (F = 2.555, p = 
0.114).  Therefore, Hypothesis 4b is not supported.  Again, this result is likely due 
to the marginal correlation that was found to exist between negative affect and the 
performance evaluation scores. 
Hypothesis 4c predicts that individuals with higher (lower) levels of 
positive affect will exhibit more (less) choice avoidance in allocating 
subordinates’ bonuses.  Therefore, individuals with higher (lower) positive affect 
are expected to award an equal (different) amount of bonus to the store managers.  
The effect of positive affect on the subordinates’ bonus allocations was 
marginally significant (F = 3.172, p = 0.079).  Therefore, Hypothesis 4c was 
marginally supported, which may be explained by the marginal correlation 
between positive affect on bonus allocations.  Participants with higher levels of 
positive affect awarded a higher amount of bonus to the North Store manager 
($25,462) than to the South Store manager ($24,538).  However, this difference is 
not statistically significant (F = 0.126, p = 0.724).  Participants with lower levels 
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of positive affect awarded a significantly higher amount of bonus to the North 
Store manager than the South Store manager ($28,686 and $21,029 for the North 
and South Store managers, respectively; F = 7.781, p = 0.007).  Participants with 
lower levels of positive affect awarded a marginally higher amount of bonus to 
the North Store manager compared to participants with higher levels of positive 
affect ($28,686 and $25,462 for low and high positive affect, respectively; F = 
2.901, p = 0.093).  Participants with lower levels of positive affect awarded a 
marginally lower amount of bonus to the South Store manager compared to 
participants with higher positive affect ($21,029 and $24,538 for low and high 
positive affect, respectively; F = 3.421, p = 0.068). 
Hypothesis 4d predicts that individuals with higher (lower) levels of 
negative affect will exhibit more (less) choice avoidance in allocating 
subordinates’ bonuses.  The effect of negative affect on the store managers’ bonus 
allocations was significant (F = 8.852, p = 0.004).  While participants with high 
negative affect awarded a different amount of bonus to the store managers 
($22,278 and $27,722 for the North and South Store managers, respectively), this 
difference was not statistically significant (F = 2.176, p = 0.145).  Participants 
with low negative affect awarded a higher amount of bonus to the North Store 
manager ($28,500) compared to the South Store manager ($21,321).  This 
difference was statistically significant (F = 11.69, p = 0.001).  Participants with 
lower negative affect awarded a significantly higher amount of bonus to the North 
Store manager compared to participants with higher negative affect ($28,500 and 
$22,278 for low and high negative affect, respectively; F = 8.583, p = 0.005).  
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Further, participants with lower negative affect awarded a significantly lower 
amount of bonus to the South Store manager compared to participants with higher 
negative affect ($21,321 and $27,722 for low and high negative affect, 
respectively; F = 9.025, p = 0.004).  Therefore, Hypothesis 4d is supported.  
Specifically, individuals with higher levels of negative affect were more reticent 
to make a decision when allocating subordinates’ bonuses compared to 




CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
The BSC is a strategic performance planning and management system that 
causally links actions and subsequent financial and nonfinancial outcomes.  The 
primary goal of the BSC is to motivate managers to engage in actions that are 
congruent with the firm’s long-term strategy.  A secondary purpose of the BSC is 
to facilitate the performance evaluation of managers charged with advancing the 
corporate strategy.  To serve this second purpose the BSC must include 
information regarding the timing between lead (typically nonfinancial in nature) 
and lag (typically financial in nature) performance measures.  If an evaluating 
manager is not provided with this information then they may hold subordinates 
responsible for measures which are outside of the subordinate’s time span of 
control.     
This study investigated the effect of providing (or not providing) 
evaluating managers with a strategy implementation timeline that explicitly 
showed the timing relationship between lead and lag performance measures on 
subordinates’ performance evaluations and bonus allocations.  This study also 
examined the moderating influence of experience on a strategy implementation 
timeline.  Lastly, this study evaluated the effects of buy-in to the corporate 
strategy and affect on BSC-based performance evaluations and bonus allocations. 
The results indicate that providing evaluators with a strategy 
implementation timeline leads them to conduct performance evaluations and 
bonus allocations in a normatively correct manner.  Specifically, when evaluators 
are provided with this information they evaluate subordinates based on measures 
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that are congruent with the long-term strategy of the firm and that are under the 
subordinates’ time span of control.  When evaluators are not provided with an 
implementation timeline they evaluate subordinates’ performance based on non-
strategically- and/or strategically-linked performance measures, irrespective of 
whether or not they have been within the subordinates’ time span of control.  
However, this result was only found to hold when managers have certain types of 
experience.  The two measures of experience that yielded significant results were 
years of full-time professional work experience and experience with being 
personally evaluated on both financial and nonfinancial performance measures. 
This study supports and extends the findings of recent studies (Griffith and 
Neely 2009; Krumwiede et al. 2011) that have examined the effect of experience 
in BSC-related contexts.  These studies have found that experience results in the 
sophisticated knowledge structures and procedural knowledge required to make 
normative decisions involving the BSC.  Consistent with prior literature, the 
experienced participants in this study appeared better able to disregard irrelevant 
information, and therefore, base their judgments and decisions on only relevant 
information.  Though not explicitly tested, prior literature (e.g., Biggs et al. 1987; 
Biggs and Mock 1983; Bouwman 1984), suggests that the more experienced 
participants in this study may have used the strategy implementation timeline to 
apply a directed information search strategy which allowed them to focus on only 
relevant information (strategically-linked measures under the subordinates’ time 
span of control).  Less experienced participants may have examined the 
information contained in the BSCs sequentially, which exposed them to irrelevant 
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information (non-strategically-linked measures and/or strategically-linked 
measures beyond the subordinates’ time span of control). 
While only two of four measures of experience yielded significant results, 
one these measures appeared superior.  Specifically, using years of full-time 
professional work experience resulted in significance at the α = 0.05 level.  Using 
prior experience being personally evaluated on both financial and nonfinancial 
measures resulted in significance at the α = 0.01 level.  While using years of BSC 
specific experience itself did not result in significance, it may help explain the 
differences between the two categories of experience that were found to be 
significant.  Specifically, when using years of full-time professional experience 
more and less experienced participants did not significantly differ in their BSC-
related experience.  However, using prior experience being evaluated on both 
financial and nonfinancial measures resulted in participants with this type of 
experience having significantly more BSC-related experience than participants 
that have not been evaluated on both types of measures.  Prior literature in 
psychology has found that the more experience and exposure an individual has 
with a particular innovation or strategy, the more intense their attitudes are 
towards it (Brannon et al. 2007).  This can result in individuals selectively 
exposing themselves to information that is consistent with what they have 
experience with in the past.  In the context of this study, the more significant 
findings that were found when using prior experience being evaluated on multiple 
dimensions may be explained by the fact that individuals with this type of 
experience also had significantly more BSC-related experience.  This may have 
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strengthened their attitude towards the BSC and their willingness and ability to 
work with the information contained therein. 
The extent to which managers bought-in to the firm’s long-term strategy 
did not have an effect on performance evaluations or bonus allocations.  This 
result may be due to the buy-in manipulation not being sufficiently strong.  
Specifically, the low buy-in manipulation appears to have led participants to buy-
in to the strategy more than intended.  While the extent to which managers 
bought-in to the strategy was significantly higher for participants in the high buy-
in condition compared to those in the low buy-in condition,  those in the low buy-
in condition had an average buy-in of 5.94 on an 11 point scale, which is higher 
than the scalar midpoint of 5.  Therefore, all participants appear to have bought-in 
to the strategy to some degree. 
This study reaffirms the call made by Stone and Kadous (1997) regarding 
the necessity of controlling for individuals’ affective states.  Both positive and 
negative affect were found to account for significant variance in performance 
evaluations and bonus allocations (though some of these effects were dependent 
on the experience measure used).  Prior literature has found that both positive and 
negative affect can result in choice avoidance, though for different reasons.  This 
study found that participants with higher levels of either positive or negative 
affect avoided making a difficult choice.  Consequently, the performance 
evaluations and bonus allocations made by these participants did not significantly 
differ between store managers.  Conversely, participants with lower levels of 
these affective states were willing to make a difficult choice and evaluated the 
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store managers normatively.  That is, these participants evaluated subordinates 
based on measures congruent with the firm’s long-term strategy (i.e., they 
evaluated the North Store manager more favorably than the South Store manager).  
This study supports prior literature, which argues that decision-making behavior 
cannot be fully understood unless both cognition and affect are jointly considered 
(Ding and Beaulieu 2009; Iyer et al. 2012; Kida et al. 2001; LeDoux 1996). 
The results of this study contribute to both practice and the BSC literature 
in three important ways.  First, this study provides evidence on the effectiveness 
of providing managers with a strategy implementation timeline when conducting 
performance evaluations and bonus allocations.  Second, this study shows the 
effectiveness of a strategy implementation timeline only manifests with 
experienced individuals11.  In the context of this study, only experienced 
participants that were provided with an implementation timeline conducted 
normatively correct performance evaluations and bonus allocations.  The 
inclusion of a strategy implementation timeline with strategy maps used in both 
practice and future research studies will aid managers with certain types of 
experience in holding subordinates accountable for only strategically-linked 
performance measures that have been under the subordinate’s time span of 
control.  Third, this study demonstrates the necessity of, at a minimum, 
controlling for affect in future BSC-related performance evaluation studies. 
This study is subject to several limitations.  First, although the case 
materials were developed to be as realistic as possible, the task and information 
                                                 
11
 This statement is subject to the caveat mentioned above that only two of four experience 
measures were found to yield significant results. 
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presentation may differ from what participants are faced with in the “real world.”  
For example, participants with experience being evaluated on multiple dimensions 
may not be evaluated on the same dimensions as those used in this study.  Further, 
participants may not have had experience working in the retail industry.  Second, 
participants in this study did not have a personal relationship with the fictional 
subordinates they were evaluating.  Evaluating managers commonly have at least 
a professional relationship with those they oversee and this relationship may 
result in performance evaluations that differ from those in a controlled 
experimental setting involving unknown subordinates.  Third, participants were 
not subjected to the same incentives or pressures that they may face in practice.  
For example, the participants did not have their own performance evaluations 
being possibly affected by the performance of the subordinates.  In practice, 
managers may be more likely to evaluate subordinates based on measures that 
they themselves are evaluated on.  Third, this study asked participants to evaluate 
the performance of a subordinate on multiple dimensions.  However, only 31-
percent of the participants actually had experience performing this type of task in 
practice.  Lastly, affect was not explicitly manipulated in this study.  Therefore, it 
is not clear if the affect individuals experienced was directly related to the case 
materials or extraneous factors outside of the experimental setting. 
Future research on the effect of a strategy implementation timeline in 
BSC-based performance evaluations should consider measuring more specific 
components of participants’ experience.  Specifically, it may be useful to ask 
participants that have prior experience using strategic performance measurement 
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systems which measures their company use.  This will allow researchers to 
understand how well the measures used in the study map onto the measures 
participants are familiar with.  Future research should also examine the 
effectiveness of a strategy implementation timeline in an actual company 
currently using the BSC.  This would help address several of the limitations 
mentioned above.  Future BSC research in general should further examine the 
effect of buy-in on BSC-based performance evaluations by making low buy-in 
conditions stronger than that used in this study.  Lastly, future BSC related 
research should consider examining how different affective states within the same 
broad valence category affect the acquisition and use of information.  For 
example, positive affect can be associated with both passive (happy, content, 
pleased, or satisfied) and active (enthusiastic, excited, or inspired) adjectives.  
Negative affect can also be associated with passive (frustration, depression, or 
fear) and active (anger) adjectives (Iyer et al. 2012).  As research on affect has 
progressed, researchers have found that affective states of the same valence can 
produce differential behavior (Iyer et al. 2012).  Therefore, researchers argue that 
it is increasingly important to look beyond the general valence states of positive 
and negative in order to provide a more complete view on the effects of affect 
(Connelly et al. 2004; Iyer et al. 2012; Lazarus 1991; Lee and Allen 2002; Lerner 







Ahn, H. 2001. Applying the balanced scorecard: An experience report.  Long 
Range Planning 34 (4): 441-461. 
 
Anderson, C. J. 2003. The Psychology of doing nothing: Forms of decision 
avoidance result from reason and emotion. Psychological Bulletin 129 (1): 
139-167. 
 
Aspinwall, L. G., & Taylor, S. E. 1992. Modeling cognitive adaptation: A 
longitudinal investigation of the impact of individual differences and 
coping on college adjustment and performance. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 63: 989-1003. 
 
Atkinson, A. A., R. Balakrishnana, P. Booth, J. M. Cote, T. Groot, T. Malmi, H. 
Roberts, E. Uliana, and A. Wu. 1997. New directions in management 
accounting research.  Journal of Management Accounting Research 9: 79-
108. 
 
Atkinson, H. 2006. Strategy implementation: A role for the balanced scorecard?  
Management Decision 44 (10): 1441-1460. 
 
Banker, R. D., G. Potter, and D. Srinivasan. 2000. An empirical investigation of 
an incentive plan that includes nonfinancial performance measures.  The 
Accounting Review 75 (1): 65-92. 
 
______, H. Chang, and M. J. Pizini. 2004. The balanced scorecard: Judgmental 
effects of performance measures linked to strategy.  The Accounting 
Review 79 (1): 1-23. 
 
Baron, R. A., K. M. Hmieleski, and R. A. Henry. 2012. Entrepreneurs’ 
dispositional positive affect: The potential benefits – and potential costs – 
of being “up.” Journal of Business Venturing 27: 310-324. 
 
Barr, S. 2011. The secret to get buy-in to performance measurement.  Dashboard 
Insight Online (March 09, 2011). 
 
Bédard, J., and T. J. Mock. 1992. Expert and novice problem-solving behavior in 
auditing planning.  Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 11 
(Supplement): 1-20. 
 
______, and M. T. H. Chi. 1993. Expertise in auditing. Auditing: A Journal of 




Biggs, S. F., and T. J. Mock. 1983. An investigation of auditor decision processes 
in the evaluation of internal controls and audit scope decisions. Journal of 
Accounting Research 21: 234-255. 
 
______, W. F. Messier, Jr., and J. V. Hansen. 1987. A descriptive analysis of 
computer audit specialists’ decision-making behavior in advanced 
computer environments. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 6 
(Spring): 1-21.  
Bonner, S. E., and B. L. Lewis. 1990. Determinants of auditor expertise.  Journal 
of Accounting Research 28 (Supplement): 1-20. 
 
______, R. Libby, and M. W. Nelson. 1997. Audit category knowledge as a 
precondition to learning from experience.  Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 22: 387-410. 
 
Bouwman, M. J. 1984. Expert vs. novice decision-making in accounting: A 
summary. Accounting, Organizations and Society 9: 325-327. 
 
Brannon, L. A., M. J. Tagler, and A. H. Eagly. 2007. The moderating role of 
attitude strength in selective exposure to information. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 43: 611-617. 
 
Bukh, P. and T. Malmi. 2005. Re-examining the cause-and-effect principle of the 
balanced scorecard.  In Accounting in Scandinavia – The Northern Lights.  
S. Jönsson and J.Mouritsen (ed.). Malmö/Copenhagen: Liber & 
Copenhagen Business School Press. 
 
Chung, J. O. Y., J. R. Cohen, and G. S. Monroe. 2008. The effect of moods on 
auditors’ inventory valuation decisions. Auditing: A Journal of Practice 
and Theory 27 (2): 137-159. 
 
______. ______, and ______. 2011. The influence of ethical conflict and emotion 
on auditors’ inventory judgments. Working Paper, Boston College. 
 
Cianci, A. M., and J. L. Bierstaker. 2009. The impact of positive and negative 
mood on the hypothesis generation and ethical judgments of auditors. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 28 (2): 119-144. 
 
Cokins, G. 2005. Performance management: Making it work: The promise and 
perils of the balanced scorecard.  DM Review Online (August 2005). 
 
Connelly, S., W. Helton-Fauth, and M. D. Mumford. 2004. A managerial in-
basket study of the impact of trait emotions on ethical choice. Journal of 




Crawford, J. R., Henry J. D. 2004. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS): Construct validity, measurement properties and normative data 
in a large non-clinical sample. British Journal of Clinical Psychology 43: 
245-265. 
 
Damasio, A., Tranel, D., and Damasio, H. 1990. Individuals with sociopathic 
behavior caused by frontal damage fail to respond autonomically to social 
stimuli. Behavioral Brain Research 41 (2): 81-94. 
 
Davis, S. and T. Albright. 2004. An investigation of the effect of balanced 
scorecard implementation on financial performance.  Management 
Accounting Research 15 (2): 135-153. 
 
Dearman, D., and M. Shields. 2001. Cost knowledge and cost-based judgment 
performance.  Journal of Management Accounting Research 13 (1): 1-18. 
 
Demski, J. 1994. Managerial uses of accounting information. Norwell, MA: 
Fluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Dilla, W. N., and P. J. Steinbart. 2005. Relative weighting of common and unique 
balanced scorecard measures by knowledgeable decision makers.  
Behavioral Research in Accounting 17: 43-53. 
 
Ding, S. and P. Beaulieu: 2009. The balanced scorecard and mood congruency 
bias. Working paper, York University. 
 
Epstein, S. 1994. Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic 
unconscious. American Psychologist 49 (8): 709-724. 
 
Estrada, C. A., A. M. Isen, and M. J. Young. 1997. Positive-affect improves 
creative problem solving and influences reported source of practice 
satisfaction in physicians. Motivatoin and Emotion 18: 285-299. 
 
Eysenck, M. W. 1982. Attention and negative Affect: Cognition and performance. 
New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Forgas, J. P. 1995. Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM). 
Psychological Bulletin 117 (1): 39-66. 
 
Franco-Santos, M., and M. Bourne. 2005. An examination of the literature 
relating to issues affecting how companies manage through measures.  
Production Planning & Control 16 (2): 114-124. 
 
George, J. M. and G. R. Jones. 1997. Experience work: values, attitudes, and 




Ghosh, D., and R. F. Lusch. 2000. Outcome effect, controllability and 
performance evaluation of managers: Some field evidence from multi-
outlet businesses. Accounting, Organizations and Society 25 (4-5): 411-
425. 
 
______. 2005. Alternative measures of managers’ performance, controllability, 
and the outcome effect.  Behavioral Research in Accounting 17: 55-70. 
 
Griffith, R., and A. Neely. 2009. Performance pay and management experience in 
multitask teams: Evidence from within a firm.  Journal of Labor 
Economics 27 (1): 49-82 
 
Guymon, R. and W. T. Mitchell. 2012. The decision motivating influence of 
strategy. Working paper. 
 
Heuer, R. R. Jr. 1999. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Retrieved from 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/psych-intel/ 
 
Hibbets, A. R., Robers, M. L. and T. L. Albright. 2012. Common-measure bias in 
the balanced scorecard: Cognitive effort and general problem-solving 
ability. Working paper. 
 
Hilton, R. W. 2008. Managerial accounting: Creating value in a dynamic 
business environment 8th Edition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
 
Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom. 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: 
Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization 7: 24-52. 
 
Hoque, Z., and W. James. 2000. Linking balanced scorecard measures to size and 
market factors: Impact on organizational performance.  Journal of 
Management Accounting Research 12: 1-17. 
 
Iacobucci. D., and A. Duhachek. 2003. Advancing alpha: Measuring reliability 
with confidence. Journal of Consumer Psychology 13: 478-487. 
 
Isen, A.M., and S.F. Simmonds. 1978. The effect of feeling good on a helping 
task that is incompatible with good mood. Social Psychology 41: 346-349. 
 
______. and K.A. Daubman. 1984. The influence of affect on categorization. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47: 1206-1217. 
 
______. 1999. Positive affect.  In T. Dagleish & M. Powers (Eds.), Handbook of 




Ittner, C., and D.F. Larcker. 1998. Are nonfinancial measures leading indicators 
of financial performance? An analysis of customer satisfaction.  Journal of 
Accounting Research 36: 1-35. 
 
______, ______, and M. W. Meyer. 2003a. Subjectivity and the weighting of 
performance measures: Evidence from a balanced scorecard.  The 
Accounting Review 78 (3): 725-758. 
 
______, ______, and T. Randall. 2003b. Performance implications of strategic 
performance measurement in financial service firms.  Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 28: 715-741. 
 
Iyer, G., D. McBride, and P. Reckers. 2012. The effect of a decision aid on risk 
aversion in capital investment decisions. Advances in Accounting 28 (1): 
64-74. 
 
Kaplan, R. 2009. Conceptual foundations of the balanced scorecard. In Handbook 
of management accounting research, Volume 3.  Edited by C. Chapman, 
A. Hopwood, and M. Shields: 1253-1269. Oxford, UK: Elsevier Ltd. 
______, and D. Norton. 1992. The balanced-scorecard: Measures that drive 
performance.  Harvard Business Review (January-February): 71-79. 
 
______, and ______. 1996. The balanced scorecard. Boston, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
______, and ______. 2001. The strategy focused organization: How balanced 
scorecard companies thrive in the new business environment.  Boston, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Kaplan, S. E., M. J. Petersen, and J. Samuels. 2011. An examination of the effect 
of positive and negative performance on the relative weighting of 
strategically and non-strategically linked balanced scorecard measures. 
Working paper. 
 
Kay, M. 2009. Renewal Capacity: Moderating the relationship between 
entrepreneurial orientation and performance in entrepreneurial networks.  
Working paper. 
 
Kelley, H. H., and J. L. Michela. 1980. Attribution theory and research.  Annual 
Review of Psychology 31: 457-501. 
 
Kida, T. E., K. K. Moreno and J. F. Smith. 2001. The influence of affect on 
managers’ captial-budgeting decisions. Contemporary Accounting 




Klayman, J., J. B. Soll, C. Gonzolez-Vallejo, and S. Barlas. 1999. 
Overconfidence: It depends on how, what, and whom you ask. 
Organizational Behaviro and Human Decision Processes 79 (3): 216-247. 
 
Krumwiede, K. R., M. R. Swain, T. A. Thornock, and D. L. Eggett. 2011. The 
effect of task outcome feedback and broad domain evaluation experience 
on the use of unique scorecard measures. Working paper. 
 
Lawson, R., W. Stratton, and T. Hatch. 2006. Scorecarding goes global.  Strategic 
Finance 87 (9): 35-41. 
 
LeDoux, J. E. 1996. The Emotional Brain: The mysterious underpinnings of 
emotional life. Simon & Schuster, New York. 
 
Lerner, J. and D. Keltner. 2000. Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-
specific influences on judgments and choice. Cognition and Emotion 14: 
473-493. 
 
Lesgold, A., H. Rubinson, P. Feltovich, R. Glaser, D. Klopfer, and Y. Wang. 
1988. Expertise in complex skill: Diagnosing x-ray pictures.  In The 
nature of expertise, edited by Chi, M.T.H. and Farr, M.J.: 311-342. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Libby, R. 1995. The role of knowledge and memory in audit planning.  In 
Judgment and decision making research in accounting and auditing, 
edited by Ashton, R.A. and Ashton, A.H. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Libby, T., S. E. Salterio, and A. Webb. 2004. The balanced scorecard: The effects 
of assurance and process accountability of managerial judgment.  The 
Accounting Review 79 (4): 1075-1094. 
 
Lipe, M. G., and S. E. Salterio. 2000. The balanced scorecard: Judgmental effects 
of common and unique performance measures.  The Accounting Review 75 
(3): 283-298. 
 
______, and ______. 2002. A note on the judgmental effects of the balanced 
scorecard’s information organization.  Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 27 (6): 531-540. 
 
Loewenstein, G. F., C. K. Hsee, E. U. Weber, and N. Welsh. 2001. Risk as 
feelings. Psychological Bulletin 127 (2): 267-286. 
 
Mackie, D. M., and L. T. Worth. 1989. Processing deficits and the mediation of 
positive affect in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 57 (July): 27-40. 
69 
 
McNamara, H., and R. Fisch. 1964. Effect of high and low motivation on two 
aspects of attention. Perceptual and Motor Skills 19: 571-578. 
 
Nelson, M. W. 1993. The effects of error frequency and accounting knowledge on 
error diagnosis in analytical review.  The Accounting Review 68 (4): 804-
824. 
 
______, R. Libby, and S. E. Bonner. 1995. Knowledge structure and estimation of 
conditional probabilities in audit planning.  The Accounting Review 70 (1): 
27-47. 
 
Nørreklit, H. 2000. The balance on the balanced scorecard – A critical analysis of 
some of its assumptions.  Management Accounting Research 11 (1): 65-
88. 
 
Nunnally, J. C., and I. H. Bernstein. 1994. Psychometric Theory (3rd Ed.) 
(McGraw-Hill, New York). 
 
Papalexandris, A., G. Ioannou, G. Prastacos, and K. Soderquist. 2005. An 
integrated methodology for putting the balanced scorecard into action.  
European Management Journal 23 (2): 214-227. 
 
Raghunathan, R., and M. T. Pham. 1999. All negative moods are not equal: 
Motivational influences of anxiety and sadness on decision-making. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 79 (1): 56-77. 
 
Russell, J. A., and Carroll J. M. 1999. On the bipolarity of positive and negative 
affect. Psychological Bulletin 125(1): 3-30. 
 
Sarason, I. G. 1975. Anxiety and self-preoccupation.  In I. G. Sarason & D. C. 
Spielberger (Eds.), Stress and Anxiety (2): 27-44. Washington, DC: 
Hemisphere. 
 
Sawyer, K. M. 2005. Evidence of choice avoidance in capital investment 
judgments. Contemporary Accounting Research 22: 1063-1092. 
 
Schwarz, N., and H. Bless. 1991. Happy and mindless, but sad and smart? The 
impact of affective states on analytic reasoning.  In Emotion and Social 
Judgments, edited by J. Forgas, 55-71. London, U.K.: Pergamon Press. 
 
Seibert, P. S., and H. C. Ellis. 1991. Irrelevant thoughts, emotional mood states, 
and cognitive task performance. Memory & Cognition 19 (5): 507-513. 
 
Shanteau, J. 1993. Discussion of expertise in auditing.  Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory 12 (Supplement): 51-56. 
70 
 
Shelton, S. W. 1999. The effect of experience on the use of irrelevant evidence in 
auditor judgment.  The Accounting Review 74 (2): 217-244. 
 
Simon, H. A. 1967. Motivational and emotional controls of cognition. 
Psychological Review 74: 29-39. 
 
Slovic, P. 2000. Rational actors and rational fools: The influence of affect on 
judgment and decision-making. Roger Williams University Law Review 1 
(6): 163-212. 
 
Stone, D. and K. Kadous. 1997. The joint effects of task-related negative affect 
and task difficulty in multi-attribute choice. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 70 (2): 159-174. 
 
Taylor, S. E., and L. G. Aspinwall. 1996. Mediating and moderating processes in 
psychosocial stress: Appraisal, coping, resistance, and vulnerability.  In 
H.B. Kaplan (Ed.), Psychosocial stress: Perspectives on structure, theory, 
life-course, and methods (71-110). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
 
Tayler, W. B. 2010. The balanced scorecard as a strategy-evaluation tool: The 
effects of implementation involvement and a causal-chain focus.  The 
Accounting Review 85 (3): 1095-1117. 
 
Thomson, K., L. deChernatony, L. Arganbright, and S. Khan. 1999. The buy-in 
benchmark: How staff understanding and commitment impact brand and 
business performance.  Journal of Marketing Management 15 (8): 819-
835. 
 
Thomson, K., and L. Hecker. 2000. The business value of buy-in: How staff 
understanding and commitment impact on brand and business 
performance.  In Internal marketing: Directions for management, edited 
by R. J. Varey and B. R. Lewis, 160-175. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Vera-Muñoz, S., W. Kinney Jr., and S. E. Bonner. 2001. The effects of domain 
experience and task presentation format on accountants’ information 
relevance assurance.  The Accounting Review 76 (3): 405-430. 
 
Victoravich, L. M. 2010. When do opportunity costs count? The impact of 
vagueness and project completion stage, and management accounting 
experience.  Behavioral Research in Accounting 22 (1): 85-108. 
 
Watson, D., and A. Tellegen. 1985. Toward a consensual structure of mood. 




______, L. A. Clark, and ______. 1988. Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 65 (6): 1063-1070. 
 
Webb, R. A. 2004. Managers’ commitment to the goals contained in a strategic 
performance measurement system.  Contemporary Accounting Research 
21 (4): 925-958. 
 
Wegener, D. T., and R. E. Petty. 1994. Mood management across affective states: 
The hedonic contingency hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 66 (June): 1034-1048. 
 
______, and ______. 1996. Effects of mood on persuasion processes: Enhancing, 
reducing, and biasing scrutiny of attitude-relvant information. In Striving 
and Feeling: Interactions Between Goals and Affect, edited by L. L. 
Martin, and A. Tesser, 329-362. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Weiss, J. J., K. Suckow, and R. Cropanzano. 1999. Effects of justice conditions 
on discrete emotions. Journal of Applied Psychology 84: 786-794. 
 
Wilson, R. M. S., and W. F. Chua. 1993. Managerial accounting: Method and 
meaning. London: Chapman & Hall. 
 
Wong-on-Wing, B. L., L. Guo, W. Li, and D. Yang. 2007. Reducing conflict in 




APPENDIX A  













* The strategically-linked measures are shown in italics above.  However, the 
actual BSCs participants viewed did not distinguish between strategic and non-
strategic measures. 
 
Figure 2. Balanced Scorecard Results. 
  
Balanced Scorecard Recent Results:
Measure Target Actual
% Over / 
(Under) 
Target Actual




1.  Net sales margin 50% 47.35% (5.3%) 53.35% 6.7%
2.  Market share relative to retail space $70 $74.00 5.7% $68.00 (2.9%)
3.  Inventory turnover 6 6.4 6.7% 5.43 (9.5%)
4.  Same-store sales growth 14% 13.00% (7.1%) 14.80% 5.7%
Customer Perspective:
1.  Customer returns as a % of sales 3.5% 3.60% (2.9%) 3.44% 1.7%
2.  Repeat sales 75% 77.00% 2.7% 73.40% (2.1%)
3.  Customer satisfaction rating 90% 92.00% 2.2% 87.50% (2.8%)
4.  Out-of-stock items 5% 5.10% (2.0%) 4.84% 3.2%
Internal Processes Perspective:
1.  Vendor rating 85% 77.60% (8.7%) 90.5% 6.5%
2.  Returns to suppliers 5% 5.40% (8.0%) 4.49% 10.2%
3.  "Mystery Shopper" audit rating 90% 97.00% 7.8% 83.10% (7.7%)
4.  Store "elegance" rating 90% 98.00% 8.9% 81.90% (9.0%)
Learning and Growth Perspective:
1.  Average tenure of sales personnel 4 3.56 (11.0%) 4.41 10.1%
2.  Employee satisfaction rating 85% 93.50% 10.0% 69.80% (17.9%)
3.  Employee suggestions per employee / year 3 2.43 (19.0%) 3.60 19.8%
4.  Hours of training per employee / year 30 36 20.0% 26.35 (12.2%)





Using the table below, please indicate how you feel right now.  Please read 
each item and then CIRCLE the appropriate answer. 
 
  Very 
slightly or 
not at all A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Active 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
 







Figure 4. Performance Evaluation Difference Score (North Store – South Store):  






Figure 5. Performance Evaluation Difference Score (North Store – South Store):  





































Figure 6. Bonus Allocation Difference (North Store – South Store):  Timeline and 






Figure 7. Bonus Allocation Difference (North Store – South Store):  Timeline and 



































Effects of Strategy Implementation Timeline, Strategy Buy-in, and Years of 
Professional Experience on Performance Evaluation Judgments (Controlling for 
Positive and Negative Affect ) 
 
 
Panel A:  Analysis of Covariance 
 
Dependent Variable:  Performance Evaluation Difference (North Store – South Store) 
 
R Squared = 0.281 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.177) 
    
Source Mean Square F p-Value 
    












BUY-IN (BI) 0.217 0.037 0.849 
    
















TL * BI * EXP 0.012 0.002 0.964 
    
Panel B:  Main Effect Cell Means for TIMELINE 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 No Timeline Timeline  
 0.591 1.998  
 (0.400) (0.429)  
 38 33  
    
Panel C:  Main Effect Cell Means for BUY-IN 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 Low Buy-in High Buy-in  
 1.350 1.238  
 (0.434) (0.392)  






(Continued from Table 1) 
 
Panel D:  Simple Effect Means for TIMELINE * EXPERIENCE 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 Low Experience High Experience  
    
No Timeline 0.704 0.478  
 (0.595) (0.533)  
 19 19  
    
Timeline 0.929 3.066  
 (0.564) (0.647)  
 18 15  











Effects of Strategy Implementation Timeline, Strategy Buy-in, and 
Multidimensional Performance Evaluation System Experience on Performance 
Evaluation Judgments (Controlling for Positive and Negative Affect) 
 
 
Panel A:  Analysis of Covariance 
 
Dependent Variable:  Performance Evaluation Difference (North Store – South Store) 
 
R Squared = 0.298 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.194) 
 
Source Mean Square F p-Value 
    
POSITIVE AFFECT 85.642 14.870 0.000 
    
NEGATIVE AFFECT 1.908 0.331 0.567 
    
TIMELINE (TL) 37.620 6.532 0.013 
    
BUY-IN (BI) 1.308 0.227 0.635 
    
EXPERIENCE (EXP) 5.241 0.910 0.344 
    
TL * BI 0.701 0.122 0.728 
    
TL * EXP 41.480 7.202 0.009 
    
BI * EXP 1.626 0.282 0.597 
    
TL * BI * EXP 0.271 0.047 0.829 
    
Panel B:  Main Effect Cell Means for TIMELINE 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 No Timeline Timeline  
 0.568 2.065  
 (0.392) (0.429)  
 38 33  
    
Panel C:  Main Effect Cell Means for BUY-IN 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 Low Buy-in High Buy-in  
 1.178 1.456  
 (0.423) (0.397)  
 33 38  






(Continued from Table 2) 
 
Panel D:  Simple Effect Means for TIMELINE * EXPERIENCE 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 No Experience Experience  
    
No Timeline 1.095 0.042  
 (0.561) (0.557)  
 19 19  
    
Timeline 0.980 3.150  
 (0.586) (0.641)  
 18 15  










Effects of Strategy Implementation Timeline, Strategy Buy-in, and Years of 
Professional Experience on Bonus Allocation Decisions (Controlling for Positive 
and Negative Affect) 
 
 
Panel A:  Analysis of Covariance 
 
Dependent Variable:  Bonus Allocation Difference (North Store – South Store) 
 
R Squared = 0.288 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.184) 
 
Source Mean Square F p-Value 
    
POSITIVE AFFECT 264.820 1.386 0.244 
    
NEGATIVE AFFECT 2150.871 11.256 0.001 
    
TIMELINE (TL) 1358.028 7.107 0.010 
    
BUY-IN (BI) 6.902 0.036 0.850 
    
EXPERIENCE (EXP) 1.089 0.006 0.940 
    
TL * BI 265.022 1.387 0.243 
    
TL * EXP 979.683 5.127 0.027 
    
BI * EXP 289.889 1.517 0.223 
    
TL * BI * EXP 5.683 0.030 0.864 
    
Panel B:  Main Effect Cell Means for TIMELINE  ($1,000s) 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 No Timeline Timeline  
 1.486 10.433  
 (2.273) (2.437)  
 38 33  
    
Panel C:  Main Effect Cell Means for BUY-IN  ($1,000s) 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 Low Buy-in High Buy-in  
 5.643 6.276  
 (2.463) (2.228)  
 33 38  






(Continued from Table 3) 
 
Panel D:  Simple Effect Means for TIMELINE * EXPERIENCE  ($1,000s) 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 Low Experience High Experience  
    
No Timeline 5.157 -2.186  
 (3.383) (3.029)  
 19 19  
    
Timeline 6.512 14.355  
 (3.207) (3.678)  








Effects of Strategy Implementation Timeline, Strategy Buy-in, and 
Multidimensional Performance Evaluation System Experience on Bonus 
Allocation Decisions (Controlling for Positive and Negative Affect) 
 
 
Panel A:  Analysis of Covariance 
 
Dependent Variable:  Bonus Allocation Difference (North Store – South Store) 
 
R Squared = 0.323 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.224) 
    
Source Mean Square F p-Value 
    
POSITIVE AFFECT 969.374 5.331 0.024 
    
NEGATIVE AFFECT 732.331 4.027 0.049 
    
TIMELINE (TL) 1606.373 8.834 0.004 
    
BUY-IN (BI) 103.464 0.569 0.454 
    
EXPERIENCE (EXP) 35.443 0.195 0.660 
    
TL * BI 69.509 0.382 0.539 
    
TL * EXP 1430.076 7.864 0.007 
    
BI * EXP 313.203 1.722 0.194 
    
TL * BI * EXP 62.639 0.344 0.559 
    
Panel B:  Main Effect Cell Means for TIMELINE  ($1,000s) 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 No Timeline Timeline  
 1.104 10.883  
 (2.204) (2.411)  
 38 33  
    
Panel C:  Main Effect Cell Means for BUY-IN  ($1,000s) 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 Low Buy-in High Buy-in  
 4.757 7.230  
 (2.376) (2.232)  
 33 38  






(Continued from Table 4) 
 
Panel D:  Simple Effect Means for TIMELINE * EXPERIENCE  ($1,000s) 
 
(Cell means with standard errors in parentheses and number of subjects) 
    
 No Experience Experience  
    
No Timeline 5.108 -2.900  
 (3.150) (3.131)  
 19 19  
    
Timeline 5.426 16.339  
 (3.291) (3.603)  








Factor Analysis of PANAS Questionnaire 
 
 FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5 
Enthusiastic 0.875 Upset 0.829 Guilty 0.883 Alert 0.750 Jittery 0.838 
Excited 0.832 Irritable 0.797 Ashamed 0.865 Attentive 0.735 Nervous 0.778 
Proud 0.820 Distressed 0.768 Scared 0.661 Active 0.535   
Inspired 0.805 Afraid 0.564       
Determined 0.796         
Strong 0.742         






Correlations – Affect  
 
 
Pearson Correlation  and p-value 
             
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3  Factor 4  Factor 5 
             






  -.263 
.023 
**  -.024 
.840 
 
             






  .284 
.014 
**  .130 
.270 
 
             






*  -.348 
.002 
***  -.097 
.410 
 
             






***  -.198 
.097 
*  -.189 
.108 
 
             






***  .202 
.084 
*  .198 
.091 
* 
             






***  -.200 
.087 
*  -.194 
.098 
* 
             
n = 71 
*** Significant at α = 0.01 (2-tailed) 
  ** Significant at α = 0.05 (2-tailed) 
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eXclusivity is a luxury specialty retail department store operated by the 
Exclusive Group in the United States.  The company is headquartered in Chicago.   
eXclusivity focuses on meeting the needs of society’s most affluent consumers 
by offering premier luxury items.  They operate twenty-nine stores spread across 
the United States’ largest metropolitan areas, with some larger cities having two 
or more stores. 
 
Approximately ten years ago eXclusivity began experiencing a sharp increase 
in competition and, as a result, a steady decline in two key metrics of this industry 
– same-store sales and net sales margin (analysts in this industry rely heavily on 
these metrics when making stock recommendations).  Consequently, management 
felt the need to take corrective action.  Six years ago the corporate executive 
team formulated a new strategy.  It was hoped that this new strategy would help 
eXclusivity reverse the declining trend in same-store sales and net sales 
margin.   The Chief Executive Officer of eXclusivity, Michael Reynolds, 
required the focus of the strategy to be on long-term value creation for 
shareholders.  Thus, he desired that the strategy incorporate a multidimensional 
approach which would help eXclusivity achieve and maintain a position as 
industry leader in same-store sales and net sales margin. 
 
Insert Buy-in Manipulation 
 
The eXclusivity “Corporate Strategy Map” is provided on the following page.  
All of the eXclusivity store managers are evaluated on measures congruent 
with the corporate strategy. 
 
Low Buy-in Manipulation 
 
The strategy was pilot-tested at four Mid-west stores over a period of three years.  
The results of the pilot-test were mixed.  Two of the four stores were able achieve 
the financial performance targets set at the corporate level and two were not.  The 
two stores that were successful found that it took an average of 2-3 years 
(average 30 months) after the strategy’s implementation for them to increase 
same-store sales and net sales margin to the goal levels.12  The corporate 
executive team made some revisions to the strategy which they hoped would 
result in a better success rate. 
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Since the end of pilot-testing three years ago eXclusivity has been rolling out 
the strategy in its other stores; starting on the East Coast and working west.  The 
results have continued to be mixed.  Specifically, approximately 12 of 20 stores 
(60-percent) have achieved the target financial performance objectives set at the 
corporate level while the remaining stores have fallen short.  The stores that were 
successful found it took 2-3 years (average of 30 months) for the strategy to 
work.13 
 
Eighteen months ago eXclusivity began implementing the strategy at two well 
established stores in the largest Western metropolitan area.  One store is on the 
North side of this metropolitan area and the other is on the South side.  Both 
stores are located in nearly identical socio-economic areas and cater to clientele 
that are demographically similar. 
 
When eXclusivity began rolling out the new strategy a memo was sent out to all 
employees stating what the strategy was and when each store would begin 
implementing it.  When the stores you oversee began implementing the new 
strategy 18 months ago you received an additional memo which contained the 
strategy and Balanced Scorecard.  The memo requested that you review the 
strategy with store managers you oversee and that they, in turn, review the 
strategy with their employees. 
 
High Buy-in Manipulation 
 
The corporate executive team used causal business modeling to develop a strategy 
that would link those measures most highly correlated with same-store sales and 
net sales margin.  The strategy was pilot-tested at four Mid-west stores over a 
period of three years.  The pilot-test results demonstrated that the strategy was 
indeed successful in helping eXclusivity to align its strategic objectives.  The 
results found that it took 2-3 years (average 30 months) after the strategy’s 
implementation for these stores to achieve the target financial performance 
objectives set at the corporate level. 
 
Since the end of pilot-testing three years ago eXclusivity has been rolling out 
the strategy in its other stores; starting on the East Coast and working west.  Of 
the stores that have implemented the strategy 19 of 20 (95-percent) have had 
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success similar to that of the pilot-tested stores and in a similar time frame (2-3 
years (average 30 months)). 
 
CEO Reynolds is a strong proponent of the new corporate strategy and 
accompanying Balanced Scorecard.  In an effort to show his support for the new 
strategy and to maximize its potential effectiveness, he has taken the following 
steps: 
 
• He has had various members of the corporate executive team that 
developed the Balanced Scorecard visit every store prior to 
implementing the strategy.  These executives hold meetings with all 
employees of the implementing store, fully explain the strategy and 
Balanced Scorecard to the employees, and hand out brochures that 
describe the strategic objectives and how they will be measured.  They 
also answer any questions the employees may have. 
 
• He assigned Brandon Lewis, a business performance analyst at 
eXclusivity, to oversee the deployment of the Balanced Scorecard full-
time. 
 
• He has required the Balanced Scorecard to be made highly visible to 
all employees by having it posted in all break rooms, employee 
manuals, and on the company’s intranet. 
 
• He also required that the company’s intranet have voice and video 
segments of the corporate executive team describing the overall 
strategy and explanations for individual objectives, measures, targets, 
and initiatives. 
 
• He has made the strategy and Balanced Scorecard an integral part of 
the orientation process for all new employees. 
 
• He requires the company’s newsletter to provide periodic reports on 
stores that have implemented the Balanced Scorecard and share 
success stories from top-performing managers. 
 
Eighteen months ago eXclusivity began implementing the strategy at two well 
established stores in the largest Western metropolitan area.  One store is on the 
North side of this metropolitan area and the other is on the South side.  Both 
stores are located in nearly identical socio-economic areas and cater to clientele 









STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE 
Train employees 





reflect an elegant 
environment 
Increase sales to 
existing customers 

























eXclusivity Corporate Strategy Map 
6 – 9 months 6 – 9 months 6 – 9 months 
Average 15 months Average 22.5 months Average 30 months Average 7.5 months 




(Continued from previous page) 
According to the eXclusivity CORPORATE STRATEGY stores will first focus on training employees on creating an 
elegant shopping environment and on increasing the satisfaction and morale of the sales associates.  Better trained 
employees will lead to the image and ambiance of the store being refined to reflect an environment of elegance.  More 
satisfied sales associates will embrace new customer focused processes and will be more able and motivated to enhance 
customer’s in-store experience.  This, in turn, will lead to higher customer satisfaction and an increase in sales to existing 





Please assume you are a divisional manager for eXclusivity in the largest 
Western metropolitan area and oversee the North and South Stores.  
  
Eighteen months ago two assistant managers were promoted to the position 
of store manager in your area and charged with implementing the new 
eXclusivity corporate strategy.  Alex Kluger, of the Portland, Oregon Store 
was promoted to store manager of the North Store and Kurt Holmgren, of the 
Seattle, Washington Store was promoted to store manager of the South Store. 
 
The corporate information system has reported recent results for both stores.  This 







Balanced Scorecard recent results:  
 
Alex Kluger, North Store 
 




















1. Net sales margin 50% 
 
47.35% (5.3%)  53.35% 6.7%  




$68.00 (2.9%)  




5.43 (9.5%)  
4. Same-store sales growth 14% 
 
13.00% (7.1%)  14.80% 5.7%  











1. Customer returns as a % of sales 3.5% 
 
3.60% (2.9%)  3.44% 1.7%  




73.40% (2.1%)  
3. Customer satisfaction rating 90%  92.00% 2.2%  87.50% (2.8%)  
4. Out-of-stock items 5% 
 
5.10% (2.0%)  4.84% 3.2%  
    
    
 






1. Vendor rating 85% 
 
77.60% (8.7%)  90.5% 6.5%  
2. Returns to supplier 5% 
 
5.40% (8.0%)  4.49% 10.2%  




83.10% (7.7%)  




81.90% (9.0%)  
    
    
 






1. Average tenure of sales personnel 4 
 
3.56 (11.0%)  4.41 10.1%  
2. Employee satisfaction rating 85%  93.50% 10.0%  69.80% (17.9%)  
3. Employee suggestions per employee / year 3 
 
2.43 (19.0%)  3.60 19.8%  
4. Hours of training per employee / year 30  36.00 20.0%  26.35 (12.2%)  
    









Average 30 months Average 22.5 months Average 15 months Average 7.5 months 

























1. As divisional manager, please indicate, on the following scale, your 
evaluation of the performance of the North Store manager, Alex Kluger, over 


















2. As divisional manager, please indicate, on the following scale, your 
evaluation of the performance of the South Store manager, Kurt Holmgren, 


















3. As divisional manager you are responsible for not only evaluating the 
managers under your supervision, but also for allocating their bonuses from a 
pool.  You have a pool of $50,000 to allocate between Alex Kluger (North 
Store manager) and Kurt Holmgren (South Store manager).  Please allocate 
the $50,000 between these two managers by writing their bonus amounts in 
the space provided: 
 
Alex Kluger 
(North Store Manager) 
Kurt Holmgren 








4. Without looking back at any prior information, please use the following scale 
to indicate how successful you believe the new eXclusivity corporate 
strategy will be in meeting competitive challenges.  That is, please indicate the 




eXclusivity stores will be able to grow same-store sales and net sales 
margins (to what degree do you “buy-in” to the corporate strategy?). 
 














Without looking back at any prior information, please respond to the following 
question:   
 
5. I was provided an explicit detailed timeline which showed how long it should 
take for the eXclusivity corporate strategy to play out as well as how long 
it should take for improvement in one category to lead to improvement in the 
subsequent category.  (Please circle) 
 
  True      False 
 
Without looking back at any prior information, please respond to the following 
questions:   
 
6. How long has Alex Kluger been manager of the North Store? (Please circle) 
 
6 months  18 months  30 months  
 
 
7. How long has Kurt Holmgren been manager of the South Store? (Please 
circle) 
 






A. Age: __________ 
 




a. Full-time professional work experience (years):  __________ 
 
b. Experience working with the Balanced Scorecard in practice (years):  
__________ 
 
c. Have you evaluated subordinates on both financial and nonfinancial 
measures in the past?  YES     NO 
 
i. If “YES”, what was the proportion of weight placed on: 
 
Financial measures?       __________ 
 
Nonfinancial measures?  __________ 
 
d. Are you evaluated on both financial and nonfinancial measures in your 
own personal performance evaluations?  YES     NO 
 
i. If “YES,”  what proportion of weight is placed on: 
 
Financial measures?  __________ 
 
Nonfinancial measures?  __________ 
 
D. Did you find the case realistic?  YES     NO 
 
E. Did you understand the case?  YES     NO 
 















G. What is your emphasis in the MBA program? 
a. Finance 
b. General Management 
c. Marketing 
d. Supply Chain 




9. Using the table below, please indicate how you feel right now.  Please read 
each item and then CIRCLE the appropriate answer using the following 
scale: 
 
(1) Very slightly or not at all (2) A little (3) Moderately       
(4) Quite a bit          (5) Extremely 
 
  Very 
slightly or 
not at all A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Active 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
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